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ABSTRACT 
 
Derailment, or the sense that one has gotten “off-course” in terms of who they are and where 
they are going, has been nominated as a precursor to psychological ills like depressive 
symptoms. However, what the development of these depressive symptoms implies for continued 
feelings of derailment remains in question. The present study investigated a potential feedback 
loop between depression and derailment to explain how these two phenomena may persist 
through time. College students (N = 939, 63.6% female) were asked to take part in a 
preregistered, 4-wave longitudinal study over the course of one academic year. An 
autoregressive latent trajectory model with structured residuals was developed to test the 
bidirectional associations of these variables at the within-person level, asking whether deviations 
from one’s mean trajectory on depression can predict downstream deviations from one’s mean 
trajectory on derailment and vice-versa. Depression and derailment evidenced significant 
autoregressive stability from one wave to the next, and significant positive covariation within 
most waves. Depression was found to significantly and positively predict later derailment across 
all cross-lagged components of the model, thus supporting the hypotheses of the present study. 
Derailment was found to significantly and negatively predict depression in two of the three 
cross-lagged components, thus failing to support the hypotheses of the present study. Given 
some of these unexpected findings, results are discussed with an eye toward future work 
uncovering potential moderators of the association between derailment and resultant depressive 
symptoms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anyone who has experienced, or interacted with someone suffering from, depression can 
attest to its jarring nature. Indeed, there is empirical evidence to suggest that depression can 
significantly erode one’s quality of life in a number of domains (e.g., Cotrena, Branco, Shansis, 
& Fonseca, 2016; Robb, Cooke, Devins, Young, & Joffe, 1997). Furthermore, a disruption in 
functioning as evidenced by impairment in social, occupational, and/or educational arenas is 
specified as a necessary criterion in Major Depressive Disorder’s diagnostic taxonomy 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). The study of depression has been a dominant 
force in both medical and psychological contexts dating back to when it was first described as an 
excess of “black bile” (Bynum & Porter, 1993) by Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.). To date, clinical 
literature has outlined a number of aspects of depression including its biological catalysts, 
environmental activators, and cognitive and neurological signatures. For as much as we know 
about what gives rise to and maintains the experience depression, we know comparatively little 
about how it interacts with global psychological processes. Consequently, insight into how 
depression relates to perceived self-change over time remains out of view. 
Perceiving stability in who one is and where they are going is vital for psychological 
health and flourishing (e.g., Ball & Chandler, 1989; Berman, Weems, & Stickle, 2006; Côté, 
1997; Erikson, 1950, 1968; Zaff & Hair, 2003). But to what extent might depression interrupt an 
individual’s experience of stability in their sense of self and self-direction? A concept known as 
derailment describes such perceived instability and, not surprisingly, has been linked with a host 
of maladaptive correlates including increased depressive symptoms, stress, and anxiety (Burrow, 
Hill, Ratner, & Fuller-Rowell, 2017). Given the negative consequences for those grappling with 
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experiences as disruptive as depression and derailment, the need for research to better understand 
how these constructs function is clear. To this end, researchers have made calls for greater 
empirical intersectionality by beginning to integrate theories from clinical psychology with 
broader perspectives on human development (e.g., Kaufman, Montgomery, & Crowell, 2014). 
Answering this call and contributing to this emergent crossroad, this thesis will explore how 
derailment and depression are related to one another over time. 
First, theoretical evidence will be reviewed in an attempt to more fully explain 
derailment’s capacity to prospectively predict depressive symptoms (as purported in Burrow et 
al., 2017). Second, research concerning the influence of mental health on cognition and self-
perception will be discussed. Finally, it will be argued that depression may be able to similarly 
forecast one’s sense of derailment downstream. Within this final argument, a cyclical association 
between depression and derailment will be proposed. This reciprocal pattern between depression 
and derailment will then be modeled and tested in an attempt to explain how these processes 
jointly exist through time. 
Like any complex human experience, however, the proposed relation between depression 
and derailment must take place within a given setting. Although this bidirectional association 
could likely manifest during any stage of life, the transition to and through college represents a 
unique period in the lifespan when identity-related questions, or questions about who we are and 
where we are going, are of immediate salience (Arnett, 2000, 2004; Azmitia, Syed, & 
Radmacher, 2008; Waterman, Geary & Waterman, 1974; Waterman & Waterman, 1971). 
Furthermore, coinciding with the undertaking of new personal, social, and academic 
responsibilities, the transition to college is often marked by high levels of stress that might put 
some at risk for the development of clinically-significant disorders like depression (e.g., Compas, 
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Wagner, Slavin, & Vannatta, 1986). As such, studying the association between depression and 
derailment might be best-suited for those embarking on the bridge from late adolescence to early 
adulthood due to the challenges endemic to this cohort. Relatively speaking, the transition to 
college occurs rather early in the lifespan and can set the course for the rest of one’s life. If 
evidence can be provided for the mutual influence of depression and identity-relevant processes 
on one another, it might be the case that future researchers, educators, and practitioners may be 
better-equipped to help address potential threats to college completion, personal development, 
and continued well-being. Theoretical and empirical investigations of this non-recursive model 
during the transition to college not only has implications for how we conceptualize depression 
and the relation between perceived self-change and mental health, but also how we move 
forward with treatment for those who are affected by one (or both) of these phenomena. Thus, 
this information could one day be used help bolster functioning and promote positive 
development throughout the lifespan.    
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Derailment 
 Drawing upon literature describing the interplay between identity and self-direction (e.g., 
Çili & Stopa, 2015; Peetz & Wilson, 2008), derailment manifests a series of self-relevant beliefs 
that describe the subjective feeling that one has somehow gotten off-course (Burrow, Hill, 
Ratner, & Fuller-Rowell, 2017). First, a highly derailed individual may believe that a past 
identity has been lost and, perhaps, replaced by a new one. That is, derailment may result from 
feeling as though who one is has changed. Second, individuals who sense derailment may believe 
that their current motivations in life and self-direction are incompatible with pursuits of the past. 
Therefore, derailment also represents the subjective sense that where one is going and why have 
changed. Third and finally, derailment may entail a perceived lack of ability (or willingness) to 
reconcile how a past identity has evolved into a current. It is important to note that, derailment is 
not dissociative in the sense that one denies temporally-distinct identities; rather, derailment 
represents a keen awareness of identity-relevant loss, and a failure to sense how one’s current 
path connects meaningfully to one’s past. 
Associated Features of Derailment and Functional Outcomes. Derailment can be 
distinguished from conceptually similar constructs, like self-continuity (e.g., Chandler, 1994; 
Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2015), in a number of ways (Burrow et al., 2017). 
First, typical methods of measuring concepts such as self-continuity, identity, and self-concept 
rely on objective change markers that ask individuals to rate themselves on various dimensions at 
different points in time or across different situations (e.g., English & Chen, 2007). While 
valuable to developmental science, such approaches fail to capture whether or not individuals 
actually feel like they have changed given that objective experiences do not necessarily have a 
5 
 
 
subjective corollary (Beck, 1974; Dobson & Dozois, 2010). Further inflating possible errors 
caused by relying solely on objective markers of change, Burrow and his colleagues (2017) 
assert and demonstrate that the negative effects of feeling derailed do not depend on the 
quantitative number of stressful life events (c.f., Holmes & Rahe, 1967) one has experienced. No 
matter the number of life events someone has experienced, feeling as though one is off-course 
appears related to increased stress, anxiety, and depressive symptoms. As such, derailment has 
earned a place as a continuous individual difference that varies widely based on an individual’s 
subjective perception of the continuity of their life course.  
A second nuance of derailment is that it may have deleterious effects regardless of the 
valence of one’s perceived change. Indeed, there is evidence that derailment continues to be 
related to negative outcomes regardless of whether an individual feels they have changed for the 
better or worse. Such a phenomenon is to be expected, as psychological equilibrium is prized 
(Holmes & Rahe, 1967). It is important to note, however, feeling as though one has changed for 
the better appears to attenuate the consequences of perceived self-change, especially when 
compared to those who feel as though they have changed for the worse (Keyes, 2000; Keyes & 
Ryff, 2000; Molouki & Bartels, 2017). Earlier literature has found perceived self-stability to be 
the most adaptive psychological precursor relative to perceived self-instability, regardless if that 
felt change is positive or negative (Keyes, 2000), thus, providing credence to this preliminary 
evidence pointing to derailment’s robust negative implications.  
Finally, and perhaps most relevant to the present study, is derailment’s long-term 
predictive utility. In addition to being negatively correlated to a number of well-being markers 
(e.g., hope, life satisfaction, identity commitment) and positively correlated with indicators of 
dysfunction (e.g., negative affect, stress) cross-sectionally, in a one-year longitudinal study, 
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derailment has been identified as a unique predictor of depressive symptomatology above and 
beyond other known risk factors for negative affectivity and depressive symptoms (e.g., Big 5 
personality traits; Burrow et al., 2017). Thus, it is clear that sensing self-instability and 
discontinuity in one’s life are a key factors in psychological malaise and overall dysfunction 
(Ball & Chandler, 1989; Keyes, 2000; Keyes & Ryff, 2000).  
Presently, individual risk factors for feeling derailed have yet to be thoroughly mapped. 
Although the effects of sensing derailment appear to be mute to objective number of life events, 
the evidence to date does not preclude the possibility that certain experiences can differentially 
predict the experience of derailment. This thesis nominates depression as a qualitatively unique 
type of life experience that can influence one’s sense of self-continuity. In the next section, I 
delve into, and attempt to explain, past evidence for derailment as a risk factor for later 
depression, thus, helping to establish the first pathway in the proposed bidirectional model.  
Why might Derailment predict Depression? 
If the association between depression and derailment is indeed cyclical, then an argument 
must be made for the mechanisms behind why derailment can anticipate later depressive 
symptoms as evidenced in Burrow and colleague’s (2017) longitudinal study. First, several 
perspectives are presented to dive further into why derailment may inform subsequent depressive 
symptoms. 
Cognitive Distortion Parallels. Among the most popular theories of how depression 
emerges and is maintained are distinct thinking styles known to negatively color cognition. 
Aaron Beck (1967, 1974, 2008) coined the term “cognitive distortions” and “common cognitive 
errors” to describe systematic biases present among the accounts of those living with depression 
(p. 280; DeRubeis, Webb, Tang, & Beck, 2010). These errors include “all-or-nothing thinking,” 
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“overgeneralizing,” “discounting the positives” (also known as “filtration”), “jumping to 
conclusions,” “mind reading,” “fortune telling,” “magnifying/minimizing,” “emotional 
reasoning,” “making ‘should’ statements,” “labeling,” and “inappropriate blaming.” Albert Ellis 
(1985) had a very similar set of maladaptive thinking styles that he believed always extended 
from a process he playfully deemed “musterbation.” When individuals musterbate, they tend to 
engage in dogmatic thinking styles where things should (or should not), ought (or ought not), or 
must (or must not) happen. Further, Ellis believed that individuals who engaged in irrational 
thinking styles also asserted the “I-can’t-stand-its” wherein patients with depression display a 
profoundly low level of frustration tolerance, or general ability to deal with events when they 
take an unexpected turn. The irrational thinking styles identified by Ellis are distilled down to the 
most common by Dryden, David, and Ellis (2010): “Dichotomous thinking,” “negative 
nonsequiturs” (also known as “jumping to conclusions”), “fortune-telling,” “focusing on the 
negative,” “disqualifying the positives,” “allness and neverness,” “minimization,” “emotional 
reasoning,” “labeling and overgeneralization,” “personalizing,” and “perfectionism.”  Many 
cognitive distortions are thought to occur simultaneously, and clients may be displaying several 
different errors in a single instance (as seen in Bernard, 1991). 
Given the amount of overlap between the maladaptive thinking styles described by both 
Beck (1974) and Ellis (1985), it may be beneficial to consider them concurrently in terms of 
derailment. First, and perhaps most strongly, derailment seems to be a manifestation of the 
“emotional reasoning” distortion. Beck (1974) suggests that emotional reasoning occurs when 
individuals erroneously believe that because something feels like it is true, it therefore must be 
true. As such, derailment may be a manifestation of emotional reasoning because it can become 
quite deeply ingrained in an individual that because certain characteristics of themselves have 
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changed (e.g., they have “matured,” stopped practicing certain beliefs, stopped engaging in 
certain activities), they feel like a different person and therefore they are a different person. This 
emotional reasoning could drive the severance of temporal identities, resulting in a sense of 
derailment. From Ellis’ view of emotional reasoning, if one feels as though they have changed, it 
must also be true. If they have changed for the worse, they have become a total failure and they 
cannot stand it. This series of beliefs might then give rise to subsequent feelings of dysphoria as 
noted in Burrow et al. (2017). 
Second, derailment may also be construed as a manifestation of the “all-or-nothing” or 
“dichotomous” thinking styles described by both Beck (1974) and Ellis (1985). In short, all-or-
nothing/dichotomous thinking occurs when people engage in categorization of events, feelings, 
or even selves. Individuals who believe they are better or worse than a past iteration of the self 
may feel disconnected from this self because of the parsing out which occurs under categorical 
thinking conditions. A highly derailed individual may be engaging in all-or-nothing thinking in 
that they may believe that they are either entirely the same or entirely different – there is no 
shade of gray. This disconnect represents the third cognitive belief found among those most 
likely to report high levels of derailment (Burrow et al., 2017). Moreover, individuals who are 
experiencing derailment may also believe that because they are not pursuing the same goals or 
ideologies as they once were, their new ideologies are inherently incompatible with their old 
ideologies. For example, an individual who started college as a medical student may not be able 
to find the connection to a past identity if they change career paths toward law or art because 
they view these paths as mutually exclusive. Furthermore, elaborating on Ellis’ view of 
dichotomous thinking, if an individual with high academic identity centrality, for example, 
receives a failing grade on an exam, it means that they are a total failure and this could very well 
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be the start of an individual sensing derailment (i.e., “I was an A-student – now I am a total 
failure because I failed one exam. I’m going from being a medical student to a janitor. Medical 
students are perfect and never fail exams.”).  
Third and finally, one might argue that derailment is a manifestation of making “should” 
statements (Beck, 1974) and engaging in broad musterbative tendencies (Ellis, 1985). Individuals 
who become derailed might feel as though a part of themselves has been lost (and that should not 
have occurred) or that a piece of themselves should not be a part of their sense of identity any 
longer. Similarly, individuals may feel as though they should or should not have become 
something. As such, these individuals may long for this piece of themselves which they believe 
is missing or, conversely, distance themselves from the piece that they feel no longer belongs. In 
both scenarios, a gap is created between an idealized self and the actual self. Feelings of personal 
estrangement may then arise, and this may manifest as derailment’s third cognitive component 
(temporal disconnection). Furthermore, in the Derailment Scale (Burrow et al., 2017), an 
exemplary item reads “I am surprised at who I have become.” If one is surprised by something, it 
could reasonably be argued that they did not expect it. In saying that one is surprised at who they 
have become, a message underlying that statement could be, “I should not have become this” or 
“this should not have happened.” This surprise could be either positive or negative in nature, but 
in any case, this track is not something that the individual anticipated and this could signal a 
disruption in continuity. For example, an individual who fails organic chemistry might feel as 
though they should have become a doctor. As a consequence, this individual’s identity as a 
medical student drifts farther and farther away and this might be quite unexpected (i.e., “this 
should not be occurring”). Compounding with all-or-nothing thoughts, the individual sees 
medical school and their new path (e.g., engineering, psychology) as two separate camps that 
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cannot be reconciled (i.e., “these two things should not go together”) and discrepant pathways 
may then emerge and spur or maintain depressive symptoms.  
Given these parallels between derailment and other well-known errors of cognition, it is 
possible that derailment may simply be an unexplored cognitive distortion. If true, derailment 
may function (at least in part) as a cognitive mechanism that establishes and maintains 
depressive symptomatology. 
Evidence from Interpersonal Psychotherapy. Erikson theorized identity as a 
psychosocial process (Erikson, 1968) – it is developed in a social space for the purposes of 
helping an individual function within a social community. Modern theorists have asserted many 
ways that individuals work toward establishing a sense of identity, but one’s roles in life appear 
to be among the richest sources of self-relevant information (see Hill & Cardador, 2015; Thoits, 
1983; 2012). Indeed, how individuals view themselves relative to their social context serves as a 
way for an individual to create a concrete senses of identity and self-direction. It is reasonable 
then to assume that these life roles figure prominently in psychological health vis-à-vis their 
identity- and purpose-engendering nature.  
That being said, role transitions have also been identified as depressive triggers in 
popular, empirically-supported theories of psychotherapy. Namely, within an interpersonal 
psychotherapy framework (IPT; Klerman, Weissman, Rounsaville, & Chevron, 1984; Weissman, 
Markowitz, & Klerman, 2007), it is theorized that difficulty adjusting to positive or negative life 
changes (e.g., becoming a mother, losing a job, getting divorced) explains why some individuals 
find themselves in the midst of a depressive episode. Therapeutic goals within the IPT 
framework focus on helping individuals gain the interpersonal skills necessary to cope with 
one’s new role and to process/mourn the loss of one’s old role so that healing and adjustment can 
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take place (Verdeli & Weissman, 2011). If one’s roles in life give rise to their senses of identity 
and self-direction, and derailment is the result of feeling as though one’s identity and self-
direction have changed, perhaps it is the case that IPT’s theory of depressive onset could provide 
some groundwork for why Burrow and colleagues (2017) found evidence for derailment’s 
deleterious nature in predicting depressive symptoms one-year downstream. Among several 
directions available for the study of derailment, its association to perceived role transitions 
represents a plausible hypothesis and fallow area for future investigation. 
Evidence from Persistent Complex Bereavement Disorder. Evidence for how changes 
in identity can disturb mental health can also be illustrated by examining how derailment might 
“fit” into other depressive-like phenomena. In Section III of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM-5; APA, 2013), “conditions for future study are 
proposed” (p. 789) with the hope of generating enough research to substantiate the bids as actual 
disorders in future iterations of the DSM. The construct of Persistent Complex Bereavement 
Disorder (PCBD), otherwise studied as “complicated grief” (Prigerson et al., 2009; Simon, Wall, 
Keshaviah, Dryman, LeBlanc, & Shear, 2011), is one such recommendation. Grief is a 
normative, understandable response to death and, following the diagnostic criteria of Major 
Depressive Disorder in the DSM-5 (p. 160-161), a cautionary note is made about diagnosing 
depression in cases of individuals who are reacting to the recent loss of a loved one (APA, 2013). 
Although the DSM-5 outlines how grief and depression are different (see also Robinson & 
Fleming, 1989; Wijngaards-de Meij et al., 2005), it is indeed possible to develop clinical 
depression during or after such a profound loss occurs (Harrison & Harrington, 2001; 
Maccallum, Galatzer-Levy, & Bonanno, 2015).  
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In the proposal for PCBD (APA, 2013), it is specified that symptoms must be persistent 
for at least twelve months following the death of someone with whom the individual had a close 
relationship. In addition to intense sorrow, longing for the deceased, and preoccupation with the 
deceased and the circumstances of their death, PCBD is particularly striking because at least six 
additional symptoms from two different clusters (“reactive distress to death” and “social/identity 
disruption”) must be present in addition to one of the aforementioned broad grief symptoms. 
While “reactive distress to death” might represent an affective (e.g., bitterness), cognitive (e.g., 
self-blame), or behavioral (e.g., avoidance) change following the death of a loved one, 
“social/identity disruption” appears more interpersonal and existential in nature. Captured under 
this category of “social/identity disruption” (p. 790) is the possibility of an individual feeling or 
experiencing (1) an intense desire to die in order to reunite with the deceased; (2) trouble with 
trusting others following the death; (3) marked loneliness or detachment from others since the 
death; (4) emptiness, meaninglessness, or inability to function without the deceased; (5) loss or 
confusion regarding one’s role in life or attenuated sense of self (e.g., “a piece has died”); or (6) 
decreased future-orientation (e.g., difficulty making plans or desertion of goal pursuits). 
These long-lasting changes in experience, especially with regard to one’s sense of self 
and interpersonal functioning following loss (Prigerson et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2011), might 
suggest that death of a loved one has the capacity to be quite “derailing” in nature. Indeed, early 
research has suggested that identity is a role-based phenomenon (e.g., Thoits, 1983) and when 
individuals are removed from certain roles, distress is incurred and well-being, purpose, and 
meaning in life are attenuated (Thoits, 2012). As such, the theoretical dots here could be 
connected in such a way to suggest that certain poignant experiences (especially those that 
impact one’s life roles) could make some individuals feel as though their identity and life course 
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have been disrupted. In turn, these intra- and interpersonal losses could set the stage for ongoing 
distress and difficulties with adjustment. 
Flipping the Arrow: Mental Health can Shape Sense of Self and Self-Direction 
The argument for mental health’s ability to meaningfully predict perceived changes in 
identity is at the crux of this thesis because it completes the cyclical model between depression 
and derailment. This argument begins with a bird’s eye view, discussing how various forms of 
psychopathology may affect how one thinks about themselves, and ends with the specific ways 
that depression could reasonably give rise to perceived identity-related changes before delving 
into the hypothesized depression-derailment effect. 
A Social-based Perspective. As noted above, Erikson (1950, 1968) postulated that 
identity serves as a means for helping individuals navigate into a social niche. In various 
explorations of mental health and the social context, movements such as “Pro-Ana” and “Pro-
Mia” (web-based communities dedicated to the support and encouragement of eating disorders; 
Csipke & Horne, 2007; Norris, Boydell, Pinhas, & Katzman, 2006) and blogs for individuals 
engaging in non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI; Whitlock, Powers, & Eckenrode, 2006) have 
emerged. On these websites, users with disordered eating and NSSI behaviors tend to find their 
lifestyles normalized, supported, and perhaps even reinforced by a community of like-minded 
users (e.g., Lewis & Baker, 2011; Lewis & Seko, 2016; Lewis, Heath, Sornberger, & Arbuthnott, 
2012; Tong, Heinemann-LaFave, Jeon, Kolodziej-Smith, & Warshay, 2013). In doing so, 
individuals may begin to develop a sense of identity that is connected with this community and 
these maladaptive behaviors (Adams, Rodham, & Gavin, 2005; Adler & Adler, 2008; Giles, 
2006; Riley, Rodham, & Gavin, 2009). These platforms then may be especially appealing to 
psychologically vulnerable individuals, especially in light of emerging correlational evidence 
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suggesting that both self-harm behaviors (Breen, Lewis, & Sutherland, 2013; Claes, Luyckx, & 
Bijttebier, 2014) and eating disorders (Stein & Corte, 2007) are significantly and positively 
associated with unresolved identity negotiations.  
Second, extending this discussion of how mental health may shape identity as a result of 
social forces, identity may also be impacted by one’s ecological environment. Early theories 
have recognized the potential for mental illness to become a part of one’s social identity (Thoits, 
1985). And, just like many marginalized groups, individuals with mental illness have 
traditionally been stigmatized and discriminated against (e.g., Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, 
& Pescosolido, 1999). The Rejection Identification Model (RIM; Branscombe, Schmitt, & 
Harvey, 1999) purports that when rejection is felt based upon group membership, identification 
with that group becomes more important. That is, discrimination tends to prompt individuals to 
think about themselves in terms of, and as a part of, a marginalized status. Contrary to what may 
be expected, research on the RIM with ethnic minorities (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999) and the 
physically disabled (e.g., Fernández, Branscombe, Gómez, & Morales, 2012) demonstrates that 
this increase in identity centrality typically results in an increased defense against stigmatization 
by way of increasing one’s sense of belonging to a given group. As such, the RIM serves as a 
mechanism that may explain how individuals who face discrimination are able to maintain a 
sense of well-being and advance toward psychological flourishing despite daily negative social 
experiences. With this said, however, the RIM does not appear to sustain in cases of mental 
illness, namely, depression (Cruwys & Gunaseelan, 2016). Cruwys and Gunaseelan’s 
preliminary evidence seems to suggest that individuals with depression received a “double 
whammy” because they are (1) at risk for discrimination based on their belonging to a 
stigmatized group and (2) cannot reap the noted buffering effects of the RIM as a result of 
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increased illness identity centrality. Furthermore, individuals who deflect a mental illness 
identity tend to experience less distress and higher positive affect than those who endorse it, even 
after accounting for treatment history, disorder severity, degree of impairment, and several other 
demographic indicators (Thoits, 2016). As such, individuals who develop a mental health 
concern such as depression might begin to think about themselves a little differently as a result of 
external feedback about one’s place relative to other social groups. 
A Cognitive-based Perspective. Some researchers view identity as a strict function of 
temporal cognition – that is, one must remember who they are, as well as their associated 
experiences, in order to create a stable sense of identity (Addis & Tippett, 2008; Conway, Singer, 
& Tagini, 2004). This is perhaps most evident in studies of identity attenuation among 
individuals with Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., Addis & Tippett, 2004). Furthermore, past and future 
thinking are highly related, both in terms of neural substrates (e.g., Okuda et al., 2003) and 
mechanistic properties (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2009), and it is 
hypothesized that the two temporal thinking styles work together to create a comprehensive 
sense of self (Çili & Stopa, 2015; D'Argembeau, Lardi, & Van der Linden, 2012; Peetz & 
Wilson, 2008). Stated differently, it appears that where we are going and where we have been 
feeds into one’s sense of self in the present moment which, in turn, helps to cultivate a sense of 
identity and self-continuity. Mental illness, however, has been shown time and time again to 
disrupt processes related to temporal thinking – both past and future (e.g., Boulanger, Lejeune, & 
Blairy, 2013; D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Kramers, Spinhoven, Van der 
Does, & Van Dyck, 2006; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Maccallum & Bryant, 2011). 
Depression, Cognition, and Impact on Identity. A disturbance in thinking characterizes 
several theories of the onset and maintenance of depression, as well as treatment intervention 
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(e.g., Beck, 1974, 2008; Disner et al. 2011; Ellis, 1962, 1985; Lazarus, 1976). In Beck’s (1974, 
2008) cognitive model of depression, it is hypothesized that genetic vulnerability (diathesis) and 
environmental triggers (stressors) give rise to dysregulated/negative schemas (ideas about the 
self, constructed from experience). These negative schemas about the self then lead one to 
engage with the environment through a biased lens of attention, processing, and memory 
retrieval. This, in turn, gives rise to reported depressive symptoms (Disner et al. 2011; Dalgleish 
& Werner-Seidler, 2014). With regard to attention, it seems that individuals with depression tend 
to be more attentive toward stimuli that are consistent with their current mood (Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, & Wells, 2008), thus, 
impairing their ability to escape from negative situations and/or focus on posit ive things that 
might improve their mood. Working alongside biased attention toward negative stimuli is biased 
processing whereby positive experiences tend to elicit weakened dopaminergic responses in 
individuals who are affected by depression, thus, dissuading them from continuing to pursue 
pleasurable activities (e.g., Pizzagalli et al., 2009; Tremblay et al., 2005) and increase the 
frequency of positive affect/reward.  
Perhaps most pertinent to the discussion of how depression may shape cognition and 
identity is literature revealing the unique memory styles of individuals in the midst of a 
depressive episode. Individuals with depression tend to outperform controls on tasks asking 
participants to recall unpleasant memories (Lloyd & Lishman, 1975) which is in contrast to 
healthy controls, who tend to recall pleasant memories faster than unpleasant memories 
(Lishman, 1974). This point is particularly salient, as this phenomenon appears to both bias and 
disrupt the recollection of autobiographical memories in patients who present as depressed 
(Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014). In particular, individuals suffering from depression appear 
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to engage in a cognitive style known as overgeneralization whereby memories are recalled in 
terms of categories that lack detail and specificity (e.g., “High school dances” vs. “My senior 
prom,” where the former demonstrates an overgeneralized memory rather than a discrete event; 
Williams et al., 2007). To discuss broadly and briefly, Williams and his colleagues postulate that 
overgeneral memory occurs in individuals suffering from mood disturbances due to (1) 
functional avoidance of specific material that may be upsetting to remember, (2) the particular 
propensity for individuals to stagnate in “capture errors” that are self-referential (given the 
negative schemas underpinning depressive symptomatology), and (3) an impoverished ability to 
override these systems due to (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2007; Gotlib et al., 2004) declines in 
executive control capacities when in a depressive episode. 
Although thinking about the past has significant implications for one’s sense of identity 
(e.g., Peetz & Wilson, 2008), the effects of overgeneral memory ripple beyond simply thinking 
about this end of the temporal vector (i.e., the past to present self). In studies of adults with and 
without depression, overgeneral memory processes are negatively associated with specificity of 
future thinking (Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose, & MacLeod, 1996) and goals (Belcher & 
Kangas, 2014). Keeping with the theme of future-orientation, it has been found that vividness 
has significant implications for both empathy and prosociality (Gaesser & Schacter, 2014). These 
processes are important to this thesis because both characteristics have systematically been 
related to the development of identity (Busch & Hofer, 2011; Hardy & Kisling, 2006) and 
identity-related processes like finding purpose in life (Damon, Menon, & Bronk, 2003). As a 
result of these overgeneral processes, the types of (1) memories recalled and (2) future events 
generated by individuals with depression are distorted. Accordingly, these biased patterns of 
thinking may have ramifications for the shaping of identity and self-direction. 
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Situating Derailment within the Purview of Depression 
Symptom Parallels. From the review above, it is clear that identity may be informed by 
both social and cognitive forces, and these forces may have the capacity to then interact with the 
status of one’s mental health. These proxy associations with identity serve as temporary 
foundation upon which an argument for bidirectionality between depression and derailment may 
be built. In attempting to construct this argument, it may be useful to scrutinize the potential 
relationship criterion-by-criterion from a theoretical framework (see Table 1).  
Starting with overarching features of Major Depressive Disorder, the DSM-5 (APA, 
2013) explicitly states in Criterion A of the disorder that the cluster of symptoms, present for at 
least 2 weeks, must “…represent a change from previous functioning” (p. 160). As such, it is a 
requirement of the disorder to experience some significant change from baseline. Furthermore, 
speaking to the subjectivity of developing depressed symptoms (and of derailment), this shift 
also must be subjectively felt by the patient or else later criteria (i.e., “significant clinical 
distress,” p. 161) cannot be satisfied.  
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Table 1. Depressive Symptoms may Initiate or Exacerbate Identity-Related Changes 
Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder1 Corollary Disruptions in Identity which may Lead to Derailment 
Predominant feelings of sadness, emptiness Change in baseline mood may give rise to perceived changes in self-concept/label. Adoption of a 
colloquially-understood mental illness identity may occur – “I am depressed.”1, 2, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 
Anhedonia Difficulty engaging in, or total disengagement from, personally expressive activities as a result of 
basic reinforcement mechanisms3, 4, 5, 6, 27 
Weight loss/gain Change in physical structure may give rise to change in sense of identity, may cause shifts in 
romantic or social relationships, or physically limit ability to engage in eudaimonic activities7, 8, 27, 
28 
Insomnia/hypersomnia Changes in cognitive functioning as a result of sleep deprivation which lead to difficulties in 
executive functioning, and/or force disengagement from pleasurable activities because of 
increased sleeping9, 10, 18 
Psychomotor agitation/retardation Change in capacity to execute pleasurable or personally-expressive activities (e.g., drawing)11, 12 
Fatigue, loss of energy Decreased sense of personal agency. May impair ability to engage with social others, typical daily 
life, or personally expressive activities9, 13, 14 
Feelings of worthlessness, guilt Loss of identity-related constructs like self-esteem and meaning in life13, 15, 24, 26, 30,  31 
Difficulty concentrating, forgetfulness, indecisiveness Difficulties with autobiographical memory retrieval affect construal of identity, difficulties with 
executive control (e.g., planning, goal-setting) affect self-direction and purpose in life16, 17, 18, 19,  20, 
21 
Thoughts of death, suicidality Associated with disrupted sense of self-continuity – impoverished ability to recognize how present 
self is connected to future self. Failure to see self in future is an inherent change of direction22, 23, 29 
Notes: 1 (APA, 2013); 2 (Cruwys, & Gunaseelan, 2016); 3 (Pizzagalli et al., 2009); 4 (Waterman, 2011); 5 (Steger, Kashdan, & Oishi, 2008); 6 (Skinner, 1953); 7 
(Sukhanova & Thomashoff, 2015); 8 (Paap & Gardner, 2011); 9 (Jennum, Ibsen, Avlund, & Kjellberg, 2014); 10 (Fortier-Brochu, Beaulieu-Bonneau, Ivers, & 
Morin, (2012); 11 (Sabbe et al., 1999); 12 (van Hoof, Hulstijn, van Mier, & Pagen, 1993); 13 (Dickson, Knussen, & Flowers, 2008); 14 (Larun & Malterud, 2007); 15 
(Beaumont & Scammell, 2012); 16 (Peetz & Wilson, 2008); 17 (Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014); 18 (Dalgleish et al., 2007); 19 (Belcher & Kangas, 2014); 20 
(Gaesser & Schacter, 2014); 21 (Williams et al., 1996); 22 (Ball & Chandler, 1989); 23 (Chandler, 1994); 24 (Piotrowski, 2013); 25 (Brewer, 1993); 26 (Sowislo & 
Orth, 2013); 27 (Ames & Leadbeater, 2017); 28 (Mehlenbeck, Farmer, & Ward, 2014); 29 (MacLeod & Conway, 2007); 30 (Shahar & Davidson, 2003); 31 (Scheier 
et al., 2006); 32 (Hogg, 2011); 33 (Thoits, 1985); 34 (Thoits, 2016); 35 (Moses, 2009); 36 (Coyne et al., 1998)  
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Depression is also a highly publicized disorder, and its hallmark symptoms have been 
found to be highly recognizable, even by lay observers (Hogg, 2011). Given its resounding 
presence in both professional and non-professional circles, it is reasonable to conclude that an 
individual, who feels a marked negative change in mood, might come to colloquially self-
diagnose as “depressed” regardless of clinical thresholds. Indeed, self-labelling processes are 
observed in clinical populations (Moses, 2009; Thoits, 1985, 2016). In doing so, individuals with 
mental disorders may begin to self-identify as being a part of a stigmatized group of those who 
are mentally ill (e.g., Link et al., 1999). This inclusion may result in increased salience of illness-
related identity via the RIM model discussed earlier (Branscombe et al., 1999) and changes in 
self-perception (Cast & Welch, 2015; McGrath & Repetti, 2002). As a result of this 
identification with a marginalized group, individuals who identify as depressed may experience 
subsequent negative impact on well-being (Cruwys & Gunaseelan, 2016; Thoits, 2016). Provided 
with this evidence that both emotions and felt inclusion in a stigmatized group can bring about 
perceived changes in self (i.e., increased identity salience and a shift in self-perception), an 
argument for significant perceived changes in identity (or, at the very least, self-concept) is 
present.  
Next, the depressive symptom of anhedonia may significantly account for changes in 
both identity and self-direction. Anhedonia, as described in the DSM-5 (p. 160; APA, 2013), is a 
“markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities… (As indicated by 
either subjective account or observation).” This feature of depression is particularly important 
because engagement in certain activities has been tied to role-based identity and purpose 
development (e.g., Hill & Cardador, 2015; Thoits, 1983, 2012). When an individual begins to 
experience anhedonia, pleasure received from activities diminishes and basic reinforcement 
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mechanisms would suggest that if positive reinforcement is no longer being received, extinction 
of the behavior will occur (Skinner, 1953). Anhedonia, therefore, may cause a person to 
disengage from previous activities that they may have found to be personally expressive or 
eudaimonic in nature (see also eudaimonic identity formation; Waterman, 2011). When these 
identity- and purpose-informing activities are no longer part of one’s repertoire, shifts in identity 
and/or purpose may occur depending on their centrality to one’s identity (Thoits, 2012). For 
example, if playing basketball was a personally expressive activity for an individual, but they 
stop playing basketball because they “no longer find it fun” (as a result of depressive symptoms 
like anhedonia), that individual’s athletically-based identity may begin to wane. Similarly, is a 
writer still a writer if they no longer write? While it is hoped that new activities may help people 
maintain a sense of eudaimonia, as noted in the biological features of depression, reward 
responses are significantly attenuated in brains affected by the disease (Disner et al. 2011; 
Pizzagalli et al., 2009) thus decreasing the likelihood of “picking up” new activities that could 
bring about fulfillment. This disengagement from activities is inherently a change and, therefore, 
a possible conclusion is that individuals may feel that they are no longer an identity associated 
with that given activity (e.g., “I am no longer a basketball player or athlete”) that may have been 
highly identity-salient.  
Although anhedonia may represent the most direct and salient argument for depression 
leading to disengagement from personally expressive activities, other symptoms of depression 
may similarly lead to changes in lifestyle. Other symptoms of depression that may be responsible 
for cultivating such changes could include weight/loss or weight gain, changes in sleeping 
patterns, issues with movement, and overwhelming fatigue. First, changes in weight may dictate 
how one spends their time. For example, changes in weight may significantly impact one’s social 
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or romantic functioning (e.g., Ames & Leadbeater, 2017; Mehlenbeck, Farmer, & Ward, 2014; 
Paap & Gardner, 2011) and individuals with difficulty forging social connections have been 
shown to struggle with consolidating a sense of self (Ratner & Berman, 2015) and sense of 
direction in life (Ratner & Burrow, 2017). Second, individuals with changes in sleeping patterns, 
for example, may experience changes in social and cognitive functioning (e.g., Fortier-Brochu, 
Beaulieu-Bonneau, Ivers, & Morin, 2012; Jennum, Ibsen, Avlund, & Kjellberg, 2014). These 
changes in functioning may then, in turn, result in difficulties engaging with personally 
expressive activities, social activities, or relationships. Individuals experiencing hypersomnia 
may simply sleep through plans they have with their peers, and people experiencing insomnia 
may have decreased capacities for the planning and execution of certain undertakings. Third, 
individuals with psychomotor issues may find once-fulfilling activities very difficult to execute 
(e.g., Sabbe et al., 1999; van Hoof, Hulstijn, van Mier, & Pagen, 1993). The relative inability to 
participate/succeed in activities that were once eudaimonic may lead one to disengage from such 
activities and subsequently shape one’s sense of self and self-direction. Finally, and perhaps 
most profoundly, individuals affected by extreme fatigue may simply be unable to engage in 
activities that once brought them much pleasure, or helped them feel like they were making 
progress toward some life goal. Beyond these arguably higher-order activities, normally 
effortless activities (e.g., showering, eating, getting dressed) can become nearly impossible for 
someone living with severe fatigue stemming from depression. In a qualitative study of 
individuals with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (Dickson et al., 2008), a loss of personal volition 
was among one of the most frequently cited consequences of the disorder and this gave rise to an 
“identity crisis.” Individuals in Dickson and colleagues’ study stated that this loss of control over 
their lives was related to difficulties with planning and forced removal from activities they once 
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loved. The patients stated that the syndrome “controlled virtually every aspect of their daily 
lives” (p. 463). This quote only provides a snapshot of a symptom related to Major Depressive 
Disorder, but testimonials like the one above offer us a glimpse into how personally (and 
psychologically) disruptive physiological symptoms like this can be. These aspects of personal 
agency speak directly to topics of personal expressiveness, fulfillment, and eudaimonic identity 
development (Waterman, 2011). 
Derailment is thought of as being couched in identity literature; however, derailment also 
includes changes in future aims, purpose, and motivation. Difficulty concentrating, forgetfulness, 
and indecisiveness are classic symptoms of depression (APA, 2013) and these issues in cognition 
can perhaps be united with the theories previously put forth regarding overgeneral memory by 
way of impairments in executive control (e.g., Gotlib et al., 2004). Perhaps it is the case that 
these executive control issues could be extended to the literature that nominates memory 
specificity as a necessary component of forming future goals (Belcher & Kangas, 2014) and 
imagining the future (Williams et al., 1996). Therefore, the maintenance of self-direction may be, 
at least in part, crippled by depression’s dampening of executive functioning given purpose’s 
organizational nature and eye toward the future (McKnight & Kasdan, 2009). In other words, 
individuals with depression may experience great difficulty in effectively planning, organizing, 
envisioning, and executing their endeavors. Coupled with other symptoms of depression (e.g., 
fatigue, anhedonia), goal pursuits may be abandoned or forgotten entirely, thereby shifting one’s 
felt sense of purpose and self-direction in life due to disengagement. Supporting this notion, 
diagnosis with, or treatment of, a psychological disorder (including depression) within the last 
twelve months appears to significantly predict severe subjective distress relevant to one’s long-
term goals (Samuolis, Barcellos, LaFlam, Belson, & Berard, 2015). These shifts in motivation 
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and direction not only affect the second feature of derailment, but also identity (given that 
identity is – in part – shaped by one’s future path; Williams & Gillovich, 2008). Therefore, as a 
consequence of changing life paths, one’s present sense of identity may be significantly altered. 
Next, perceived self-worth has been positively tied to both identity (Ryeng, Kroger, & 
Martinussen, 2013) and purpose (Scheier et al., 2006) processes vis-à-vis self-esteem. With 
regard to directionality, in a meta-analytic review by Sowislo and Orth (2013), it was found that 
depression significantly erodes feelings of self-esteem. This idea supports a model sometimes 
referred to as the “scar model” of depression (Coyne, Gallo, Klinkman, & Calarco, 1998; Shahar 
& Davidson, 2003) whereby it is believed that depressive symptoms may leave lasting 
impressions on one’s self-concept (of which, self-esteem is significantly implicated; Campbell, 
1999). Although Sowislo and Orth found that the reverse relationship was stronger (i.e., that 
decreases in one’s self-esteem leaves one vulnerable to developing depression), two significant 
directional effects (also see Harter & Jackson, 1993; Orth & Robins, 2013) suggests that the 
relationship between self-esteem and depression may be cyclical in nature. Indeed, a reciprocal-
relations model of depression and self-esteem has been proposed (Orth & Robins, 2013; Shahar, 
Blatt, Zuroff, Kuperminc, & Leadbeater, 2004). It may be extended from these findings that 
when depressive symptoms arise, shifts in identity and self-direction may feasibly occur by way 
of worsening self-esteem and the lasting mark depression leaves on those it touches. 
Furthermore, when depressive symptoms bring about feelings of worthlessness, disengagement 
from meaningful goals may occur due to deterioration in related domains like self-efficacy 
(Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2004; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002; Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001). 
This disengagement from meaningful life goals could perceivably give rise to the sense that one 
has changed life course.  
25 
 
 
Following a discussion of self-worth, the final symptom of depression is approached: 
Suicidal ideation. On one hand, it has been hypothesized that suicidal ideation is, in part, the 
result of a penurious sense of self-continuity (Ball & Chandler, 1989; Chandler, 1994). 
Evidenced by Ball and Chandler (1989), hospitalized adolescents at risk for suicide show a near 
incapacity to recognize personal- and other-sameness in spite of characterological change. Ball 
and Chandler (1989) theorize that suicidal youth’s extreme difficulty with seeing the self as a 
continuous figure underpins their impoverished ability to see how one’s future self must deal 
with the consequences of the decisions made by one’s present self. In their reasoning, anyone 
who is able to see the future as a mere continuation of the present has stake in ensuring the future 
self’s well-being. Such an argument draws upon early theories of consciousness (e.g., James, 
1910) which hold that knowing one persists allows people to commit to an otherwise 
unknowable future. Those with a more disrupted sense of continuity may not be able to make 
such a connection, thus, putting them at greater risk for deliberate self-harm in the present 
moment. Similarly, a study by MacLeod and Conway (2007) compared suicidal and control 
subjects on tasks where they were asked to generate self-relevant and other-relevant future 
events. While the suicidal and control groups did not significantly differ in terms of ability to 
generate other-relevant future events, control participants outperformed suicidal participants in 
generating self-relevant future events. As such, MacLeod and Conway conclude that perhaps 
individuals feel suicidal as a result of not being able to see themselves in the future. Indeed, it 
seems to be the case that the well-being benefits of future thinking cannot be reaped without 
some degree of plausibility, as perceived likelihood of a given goal helps maintain engagement 
with that goal (Schmuck & Sheldon, 2001).  
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In the same breath, it might also be said that because suicidal individuals have difficulty 
imagining the future, and it is known that past and future thinking are highly related (e.g., 
Schacter & Addis, 2009), one’s sense continuity could be significantly disrupted by these noted 
difficulties with temporal thinking. Consequently, it seems highly unlikely that one can develop, 
maintain, and amend self-direction and identity content if suicidality is related to difficulties in 
temporal thinking. Further, if one does not see themselves living beyond the present moment, 
they are unlikely to take the steps to make plans for the future or engage in any behaviors 
conducive to a once-present sense of self-direction. Perhaps it is the case that once one starts to 
contemplate ending their life, a decrease in engagement with temporal thinking takes place due 
to a hopeless and negative view of the future (key components of the cognitive triad of 
depression; Beck, 1967). This could significantly stifle one’s ability to think about where they 
are headed thus significantly weakening or changing one’s present sense of identity.  
In short, it is highly unlikely for an individual to begin life with doubts about persisting 
into the future. Individuals gain the ability to project themselves into the future between the ages 
and 3 and 5 years (Atance, 2008; Atance & O’Neill, 2005) and when you ask a child what they 
would like to be when they grow up, you will probably be met with answers like “doctor,” 
“fireman,” and “veterinarian.” Thus, suicidal ideation may represent an inherent change of self-
direction because no greater threat to one’s current course exists than the threat that one’s course 
ceases entirely. Such is the case when individuals can no long envision themselves living beyond 
the present and this, reasonably, is the epitome of derailment. 
The Transition to College: Setting the Stage for a Confluence of Reviewed Processes 
 To this point, the relationship between depression and derailment has been discussed 
devoid of setting. The transition to adulthood, and the college experience in particular, is a 
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setting that provides a compelling space for individuals to grow and change. Most importantly, 
however, college may provide an opportunity for individuals to be highly attentive to that 
change. In the college context, individuals are often confronted with questions relevant to who 
they are and where they are going. The most archetypal examples of this include asking students 
to select a major, or the existence of social groups based on occupational goals. The increased 
salience of these types of questions in college could feasibly exacerbate one’s susceptibility to 
feeling derailed. While many individuals flourish in college, it is also an environment where 
some may flounder. For this latter group, identifying the developmental pathways that lead 
toward depressive symptoms and derailment is important.  
The Search for Identity in College and Associated Problems. For emerging adults, the 
college environment can assist the search for a tangible sense of identity and self-direction. In 
most postsecondary settings, individuals gain exposure to ideological and cultural diversity, and 
take a variety of courses from different areas of study. As a result, college may provide a space 
for individuals to “try on” several different possible selves thus facilitating identity exploration 
(Dunkel, 2000; Dunkel & Anthis, 2001; Markus & Nurius, 1986). Although many finish college 
with higher degrees of identity commitment relative to the start (e.g., Meeus, 2011; Waterman, 
1982; Waterman, Geary & Waterman, 1974; Waterman & Waterman, 1971), finding this sense is 
not easy. Indeed, identity distress (uneasiness stemming from inconsistent identity commitments 
or incomplete identity formation; Berman, Montgomery, & Kurtines, 2004) often accompanies 
heightened identity exploration and low identity commitment. At its worst, identity distress may 
lead to impairment given that Berman and his colleagues modeled measurement of the construct 
after identity-relevant dysfunction found in earlier versions of the DSM (e.g., APA, 1987). 
Lending credence to this idea of identity-related impairment, identity distress has been 
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consistently linked to several negative mental health outcomes including symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, somatization, and substance misuse (e.g., Berman, Weems, & Stickle, 2006; 
Samuolis et al., 2015). As such, the normative identity exploration that occurs during college 
may bring with it, for some, clinical symptoms that can wreak havoc on their functioning. 
Even for those who enter college knowing who they are and where they are headed, 
learning “how to adult” is an incredible change of pace. When individuals leave home for the 
first time, in a matter of only a few months, they must adjust to a new physical environment, 
cope with the loss of old peer groups, assimilate into new peer groups, negotiate changes in 
parent-child dynamics, and organize newfound academic and financial responsibilities (Aquilino, 
2006; Avard, Manton, English, & Walker, 2005; Larose & Boivin 1998; Pascarella & Terenzini, 
2005). Due to all these moving parts, this life transition can be understandably overwhelming, 
and college students – especially freshmen – are vulnerable to stress (e.g., Compas, Wagner, 
Slavin, & Vannatta, 1986). Given the demands of becoming an adult, it may be rather 
unsurprising to learn that the transition to college often marks the onset of many clinical 
concerns such as increased depressive symptomatology (Alfeld-Liro & Sigelman, 1998; Dyson 
& Renk, 2006), substance use and experimentation (Barnes, Welte, Hoffman, & Tidwell, 2010; 
Maggs, 1997; O'Malley & Johnston, 2002; White, Labouvie, & Papadaratsakis, 2005), anxiety 
and sleep disturbances (Doane, Gress-Smith, & Breitenstein, 2015), and disordered patterns of 
eating and compensatory behavior (Eisenberg, Nicklett, Roeder, & Kirz, 2011; Schaumberg, 
Anderson, Reilly, & Anderson, 2014). Although many individuals may experience problems that 
are time-limited in nature (e.g., White, Labouvie, & Papadaratsakis, 2005), helping people cope 
with the transition to and through college may be able to help promote personal and academic 
outcomes for a broader array of individuals. 
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The Present Study 
In establishing that derailment may indeed predict downstream depressive symptoms, 
Burrow and colleagues (2017) inspire new avenues for the investigation of how perceiving self-
change impacts well-being. Based on what is known about how depression shapes cognition 
(e.g., Beck, 2008; Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011) and one’s daily lived experiences 
(APA, 2013), this thesis investigates how derailment may also be an outcome of depression. A 
depression-derailment feedback loop is proposed, such that the two work in tandem to predict 
one another through time. Armed with such knowledge, researchers and practitioners might be 
able to triangulate and better identify individuals most vulnerable to subsequent negative mental 
health outcomes. The present study will empirically test if such reciprocity exists between 
depression and derailment by following a cohort of students over the course of one year at 
college. By gaining a more comprehensive view of these dynamic processes, it is hoped that the 
results of this study can help start a conversation about how to smooth the course of this major 
life transition, and improve psychological outcomes for those navigating it.  
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METHOD 
Participants 
 At Wave 1 a total of 939 participants provided contact information and at least partial 
data. From this initial participant pool, participants were recruited to take part in subsequent 
waves of the study. Attrition throughout the course of the study was moderate: At Wave 2, 
64.11% (n = 602) of participants returned; at Wave 3, 47.39% (n = 445) of participants returned; 
and at Wave 4, 44.83% (n = 421) of participants returned. Among cases providing at least partial 
data at Wave 1, this study experienced a total of 56% attrition by Wave 4. 
The sample was comprised of largely female participants (63.6%, n = 597), and ranged in 
age from 16 to 31 years (M = 18.64, SD = 1.55). Out of the entire sample, only 8.0% (n = 75) of 
participants did not report their biological sex or their age. Participants were largely freshmen 
(62.0%, n = 582) students, but the sample spanned across all years of college. A total of 10.3% 
(n = 97) reported being in their sophomore year, 8.8% (n = 83) reported being in their junior 
year, 9.3% (n = 87) reported being in their senior year, 0.4% (n = 4) reported being of 5th-year 
senior status, and 1.0% (n = 9) reported being graduate students. Only 8.2% (n = 77) did not 
report their academic year. Over one-third (35.6%, n = 334) of the participants reported being 
from the College of Human Ecology, but several other colleges from the university were also 
represented: 13.3% (n = 125) were from the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences; 1.3% (n = 
12) were from the College of Architecture, Art, and Planning; 21.2% (n = 199) were from the 
College of Arts and Sciences; 15.9% (n = 149) were from the College of Engineering; 1.9% (n = 
18) were from the School of Hotel Administration; and 2.7% (n = 25) were from the School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations. No students reported being from Cornell Law School, Samuel 
Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management, or the College of Veterinary Medicine and 
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8.2% (n = 77) of the sample failed to report their college affiliation. A total of 65.6% (n = 616) 
of participants identified this academic year as being their first year away from home for 
college/university. 
The sample was predominantly split between participants who identified 
racially/ethnically as White/Caucasian, non-Hispanic 39.4% (n = 338) and Asian/Asian-
American or Pacific Islander 32.8% (n = 308). Smaller subsets of participants identified as 
Black/African-American, non-Hispanic 6.0% (n = 56); Hispanic or Latino/a 5.1% (n = 48); 
Native American or Alaskan Native 0.4% (n = 4); an unlisted racial/ethnic background 1.5% (n = 
14); and multiracial 9.6% (n = 90). A total of 8.6% (n = 81) failed to report their racial/ethnic 
background. Highest reported level of maternal education varied across participants. A total of 
3.2% (n = 30) reported that their mother did not complete high school, 7.7% (n = 72) reported 
that their mother had obtained a high school diploma or equivalent, 13.1% (n = 123) reported 
that their mother had completed some college or vocational/technical school, 30.9% (n = 290) 
reported that their mother had completed their bachelor’s degree, and 36.7% (n = 345) reported 
that their mother had completed graduate or professional school. Similarly, 3.6% (n = 34) 
reported that their father did not complete high school, 8.3% (n = 78) reported that their father 
had obtained a high school diploma or equivalent, 8.7% (n = 82) reported that their father had 
completed some college or vocational/technical school, 26.8% (n = 252) reported that their father 
had completed their bachelor’s degree, and 44.1% (n = 414) reported that their father had 
completed graduate or professional school. Missing data comprised 8.4% (n = 79) of both 
maternal and paternal educational background data. 
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Materials 
 Assessments reported below were a part of a larger longitudinal study of developmental 
changes that occur during the course of a year at college. The measures/variables reported and 
analyzed here are only those relevant to the present study’s hypotheses. A complete copy of the 
survey can be found in Appendix A. 
 Demographic Questionnaire. A demographic survey was developed for the purposes of 
the present study. Participants were asked to provide demographic information at the end of the 
Wave 1 survey. Participants choosing not to disclose specific demographic information were 
asked for this missing information again at subsequent waves until it was reported or the study 
ended.  
 Beck Depression Inventory-II. The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, 
& Brown, 1996) is among the most widely used self-reported clinical assessment tools for 
quantifying depressive symptoms. Participants are asked to pick one statement from a presented 
group of four that best represents the way they have been feeling on twenty-one dimensions over 
the past two weeks. Each dimension represents a single item on the scale with responses ranging 
from a numerical indicator of 0 to 3. Dimensions cover topics such as sadness, guilty feelings, 
punishment feelings, self-dislike, agitation, crying, suicidal ideation, worthlessness, changes in 
sleeping pattern, loss of energy, and tiredness or fatigue. As an example, participants responding 
to the “Sadness” item could choose among the four following descriptors: “I do not feel sad,” “I 
feel sad much of the time,” I am sad all of the time,” and “I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t 
stand it.” If multiple statements within each group apply to a person equally, the participant is 
asked to select the statement that appears furthest down the group’s list (corresponding to a 
higher numerical rating). Scores on this measure are summed across the 21-items resulting in a 
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composite score ranging from 0 to 63. Since the scores are summed, a score of 2, for example, 
could correspond to an individual marking moderate elevation on one item or slight elevation on 
two items. Scores of 0-10 indicate normative mood fluctuation, 11-16 indicate a mild mood 
disturbance, 17-20 indicate borderline clinical depression, 21-30 indicate moderate depression, 
31-40 indicate severe depression, and scores of 41 and above indicate extreme cases of 
depression. For the composite score, the BDI-II has demonstrated excellent internal consistency 
(α = .92). In the present study, the BDI-II evidenced sufficient internal consistency across all 
four waves (calculated using listwise deletion of missing cases; αW1 = .89, αW2 = .92, αW3 = .92, 
αW4 = .95). 
 The Derailment Scale. The Derailment Scale (Burrow, Hill, Ratner, & Fuller-Rowell, 
2017) is a 10-item self-report measure used to assess the degree to which individuals feel 
temporally discrepant in their sense of self and self-direction. Participants are asked to rate the 
extent to which they agree with statements (e.g., “I’m surprised at who I’ve become”) on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from (1) ‘Strongly Disagree’ to (5) ‘Strongly Agree.’ In its validation, 
the Derailment Scale evidenced sufficient internal consistency ranging from α = .74 to α = .88 
across the six studies presented. Internal consistency across the four waves for the present study 
also evidenced acceptable estimates (calculated using listwise deletion of missing cases; αW1 = 
.81, αW2 = .79, αW3 = .78, αW4 = .78). 
Procedure 
 The present study was approved by Cornell University’s Institutional Review Board 
(Protocol ID#: 1606006394; see Appendix B). Participants were recruited by having Wave 1 of 
the survey distributed through resident hall email listservs, the College of Human Ecology email 
listserv, and flyers distributed in-person at freshmen orientation. Participants accessing the link 
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were directed to Qualtrics to view the Wave 1 consent form (see Appendix C). Data for Wave 1 
of the survey was collected from August 15th, 2016 to September 1st, 2016. Once the initial 
participant pool was established, participants were invited to participate in subsequent waves of 
the study via email at the beginning and end of the Fall 2016 and Spring 2017 semesters. Data 
for Wave 2 of the study was collected from November 13th, 2016 to December 2nd, 2016; data for 
Wave 3 of the study was collected from February 4th, 2017 to February 19th, 2017; and data for 
Wave 4 of the study was collected from April 23rd, 2017 to May 7th, 2017. To be clear, the end-
of-semester survey was intentionally collected before the beginning of the university-wide “final 
exam period.” During this period, lectures have ended and students are given uninterrupted time 
to study before final exams are scheduled. The plan to collect data while lectures were still in 
session was employed to (1) aim for the most participant retention and (2) reduce the conflation 
of depression scores with the inherent stress of studying/taking part in final exams. Participants 
were asked to re-consent at the start of each wave, and provide their NetID (a form of 
identification that we could use to follow-up with them via email for later waves). NetIDs were 
converted to CaseIDs following data collection to maintain participant anonymity. The survey 
took participants approximately 15 minutes to complete. If a participant missed a wave, they 
were allowed to take part in subsequent waves.  
During each wave, participants were offered a coupon to The Cornell Store (Cornell 
University’s bookstore) plus an opportunity to win a gift card to The Cornell Store via raffle. At 
the end of each survey, participants received a coupon code that could be redeemed at any of The 
Cornell Store’s in-store locations. At Wave 1, participants were guaranteed a $5-off coupon to 
The Cornell Store plus an opportunity to win a $100 or $50 gift card. At Wave 2, participants 
were guaranteed a coupon for 25%-off one Cornell-branded item from The Cornell Store plus an 
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opportunity to win a $50 gift card. At Wave 3, participants were offered a coupon for 25%-off 
one hooded sweatshirt from The Cornell Store plus an opportunity to win a $50 gift card. At 
Wave 4, participants were offered a coupon for 25%-off their entire purchase at The Cornell 
Store plus an opportunity to win a $100 gift card or one of two $50 gift cards. Participants were 
given an extra ticket in the final, Wave 4 raffle for every wave they responded to over the course 
of the academic year (maximum number of tickets: 4). Participants who took part in all four 
waves of the study were entered into a special raffle pool, where they had an additional chance to 
win a $100 gift card or one of two $50 gift cards. 
A project page for this study was created with the Open Science Framework (OSF) on 
June 20th, 2017 (https://osf.io/ewnva/). The project was successfully registered on the same day 
(https://osf.io/w3db7/) with an embargo to be lifted on January 1st, 2018. The embargo was 
instituted with the hope that the present study, as well as the currently in-revision manuscript of 
the derailment measurement piece (Burrow et al., 2017), could be completed before the data and 
study information became public record. Data relevant to the present study’s analyses, R script, 
and the preregistration document can all be found at the project/registration pages on OSF. 
Should any of the R script change (due to overlooked errors, exploratory analyses, etc.), the most 
up-to-date documents will be uploaded onto the editable OSF project page 
(https://osf.io/ewnva/). Unregistered significance tests will be explicitly labeled as exploratory 
both in the present thesis and in any subsequent peer-reviewed publications.  
Analytic Strategy 
All analyses were completed using SPSS (Version 24), R (R Core Team, 2017) and R 
Studio software (RStudio Team, 2016). Basic descriptive data for relevant study variables were 
first derived for each wave. At each wave, participants were asked to complete a blatant 
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instructional attention check. Participants failing an attention check had their data for that wave 
excluded; however, if the same participant passed the attention check at a different wave, their 
data on that wave was retained. Asking participants to complete instructional attention checks 
does not appear to influence subsequent responses (Kung, Kwon, & Brown, 2017). The 
structural model described below was also examined for outliers using the generalized Cook’s 
Distance (Cook, 1977; Flora, LaBrish, & Chalmers, 2012; Pek & MacCallum, 2011) function in 
the faoutlier package (Chalmers & Flora, 2015). Cook’s distance values were then plotted on a 
boxplot and cases falling more than 2.5 times the interquartile range were excluded from 
analyses. Missing data within the structural equation models were treated using Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation, implicitly assuming that data are at least missing at random 
(MAR; Little & Rubin, 1986). 
When the present study was conceptualized, a common tool of developmental 
methodology was planned to test the bidirectional influence of two variables on one another over 
time: The autoregressive cross-lagged panel model (ACLP; Campbell, 1963; Kenny, 1973). 
Despite its popularity, several limitations of the ACLP model have been noted including the 
ACLP model’s inability to separate between- and within-person effects over time. This 
conflation of non-equivalent effects often results in inflated path estimates, thus making the 
ACLP model not ideally suited for making inferences about intra-individual change (see also 
Berry & Willoughby, 2016). In response to this criticism, to test the main study hypothesis, a 
latent curve model with structured residuals (see Figure 1; Curran, Howard, Bainter, Lane, & 
McGinley, 2014) was employed using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) in R Studio. The R 
script for removing attention failures, detecting outliers, and constructing this model is provided 
on the OSF editable project page for this study (https://osf.io/ewnva/). 
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Following the suggestions of Kline (2010), the chi-square statistic, Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI; Bentler, 1990), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis, 1973), Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC), Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC), root mean square error of approximation 
(RSMEA; Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Steiger & Lind, 1980), and standardized root mean square 
residual (SRMR; Bentler, 1995) will be reported and used to determine model adequacy. To 
judge if the model fits the data, a chi-square statistic with an associated p-value greater than .05, 
a CFI and TFI value greater than .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999), an RSMEA value less than .10 
(MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996), and an SRMR value less than .08 (Hu & Bentler, 
1999) were sought. The standard p < .05 criterion was used to appraise the coefficients of all 
modeled pathways. It was hypothesized that the residual estimates of both constructs (depression 
and derailment) would evidence significant stability across time, crossed effects between waves 
would evidence significant and positive associations, and depression and derailment would 
significantly and positively covary at each wave.
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Hypothesized Association between Depression and 
Derailment using an Autoregressive Latent Trajectory Model with Structured 
Residuals 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Unregistered Preliminary Analyses  
Descriptive Statistics and Frequencies. Descriptive statistics for the sample on 
depression and derailment variables were first derived for each wave, and then calculated for the 
total score across the waves (Table 2). Figure 2 displays histograms with overlaid Kernel Density 
Estimates, for the distribution of scores on depression and derailment at each of the four waves. 
Finally, spaghetti plots of derailment (Figure 3a) and depression (Figure 3b) show the individual 
trajectories of these constructs, for every person taking part in the study, over time. The 
thickened line in Figures 3a and 3b is the average (i.e., between-person) trajectory across all time 
points of study. 
 
Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics of Depression and Derailment 
Notes: Descriptive statistics recovered using listwise deletion to handle missing cases. 
Dep. = Depression, Derail. = Derailment.  
Wave 
Dep. 
n 
Dep. 
M (SD) 
Dep. 
Min. – Max. 
Derail. 
n 
Derail. 
M (SD) 
Derail. 
Min. – Max. 
1 (Start, Fall 2016) 854 7.68 (7.28) 0 – 52 884 3.23 (0.64) 1.20 – 4.90 
2 (End, Fall 2016) 581 9.57 (8.84) 0 – 56 588 3.17 (0.64) 1.00 – 4.60 
3 (Start, Spring 2017) 414 8.30 (8.61) 0 – 59 425 3.19 (0.68) 1.10 – 5.00 
4 (End, Spring 2017) 381 10.05 (10.54) 0 – 59 386 3.17 (0.62) 1.30 – 4.70 
Total  8.69 (8.62) 0 – 59  3.20 (0.65) 1.00 – 5.00 
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Figure 2. Histograms of Derailment and Depression at Each Wave. Black line is the Kernel 
Density Estimate for the distribution at the indicated wave.  
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Figure 3. Spaghetti Plots of Derailment and Depression Trajectories over the Course of the 
Study. Black lines each represent an individual case over the course of the study whereas the 
blue solid line represents the average trajectory of the mean scores. Transparency has been added 
to the individual trajectories to show where lines appear most dense. 
 
As mentioned above, the data for the present analyses were collected as part of a larger 
longitudinal study. An attention check was embedded in measures that appeared after depression 
and derailment scales were presented. After preregistration, it was discovered that some cases 
had a missing attention check and data on depression/derailment within the same wave (e.g., the 
participant had started the study and quit midway). In the interest of power, these missing 
attention check cases were retained. Among those with usable data on at least derailment (the 
first measure appearing first in the battery), at Wave 1, a total of 107 individuals failed the 
attention check, 60 participants were missing the attention check, and the vast majority of 
participants (n = 717) passed it. At Wave 2, a total of 84 individuals failed the attention check, 
26 were missing the attention check, and 478 passed it. At Wave 3, a total of 48 individuals 
failed the attention check, 19 participants were missing the attention check, and 358 individuals 
passed it. Finally, at Wave 4, a total of 33 individuals failed the attention check, 15 participants 
42 
 
 
were missing the attention check, and 339 individuals passed it. Descriptive statistics calculated 
above include individuals who had failed the attention check to get a sense for the baseline data. 
All analyses that follow utilize data that have been cleansed of cases with attention failures. 
Univariate Latent Growth Models. For purely descriptive purposes, depression and 
derailment were modeled separately in unconditional univariate latent growth models. Each 
growth model began with an intercept-only model, followed by successive additions of slope and 
time-adjacent autoregressive factors. Then, because of their nested nature, Likelihood Ratio 
Tests (LRT) were conducted to determine which growth models, for depression and derailment 
respectively, best fit the data. Such a progressive model-building strategy is employed by many 
researchers interested in ultimately testing complex, dynamic models (e.g., Curran et al., 2014). 
Regardless of the results that follow, the ALT-SR as specified in the analytic strategy and 
preregistration (i.e., with linear components and time-adjacent auto-regressions) was followed as 
closely as possible to test the hypotheses of interest. These descriptive univariate models, 
however, may be able to provide a useful guide should respecification of the hypothesized model 
be necessary. 
First, an intercept-only latent growth model was fit for depression over the course of the 
study. This model included a mean and a variance structure for an intercept factor along with 
residuals among the repeated-measure manifest variables that were constrained to be equal over 
time. As one may expect, this no-change model fit the data poorly (see Table 3). Next, a slope 
factor (λt = 0, 1, 2, 3) was added to the intercept-only model to test an average linear trajectory of 
depression. Again, the residuals of the repeated-measure manifest variables were equated. Along 
with their covariance, a mean and a variance for the intercept and slope factors were also 
estimated. As can be observed in Table 3, this model had an overall fit that appears superior to 
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the intercept-only model, but still performs slightly below typically-accepted model thresholds 
(Kline, 2010). Because the intercept-only model is nested within the linear model, a formal 
comparison of model fit was performed using a Likelihood Ratio Test. Indeed, the linear model 
appeared to perform significantly better than the intercept-only model (χ2Δ(3) = 133.28, p < .001) 
despite its less-than-ideal overall model fit. Finally, the linear model was expanded to include 
time-adjacent auto-regressions. This autoregressive model evidenced adequate overall fit 
according to most tests (see Table 3), and fit the data significantly better than the linear model 
for depression (χ2Δ(3) = 58.43, p < .001).  
Because of its superior model fit, the linear depression model with time-adjacent auto-
regressions was chosen for interpretation. Over the course of the study, depression scores 
evidenced significant and positive rank-order stability from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (b = .16, SE = 
.06, p = .007), but not from Wave 2 to Wave 3 (b = -0.04, SE = .09) or from Wave 3 to Wave 4 
(b = 0.04, SE = .15). The intercept and the slope evidenced a significant and positive covariance 
(ψis = 3.40, SE = 1.65, p = .039) indicating that cases with the highest starting depression scores 
changed, on average, the most over the course of the study. The intercept factor for depression 
evidenced significant mean (𝜇?̂? = 7.66, SE = 0.25) and variance (𝜓?̂? = 32.36, SE = 3.03) 
estimates, indicating an average non-zero starting value and potentially informative individual 
variability around the depression starting score. The mean of the slope factor for depression (𝜇?̂? = 
.54, SE =.43, p = .212) and the observed variance among the individual trajectories (𝜓?̂? = 2.57, 
SE = 1.33, p = .053) failed to reach statistical significance, indicating that the average rate of 
change was somewhat similar across participants and the average depression score was changing 
very little over the course of the study. 
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The same incremental latent growth modeling procedure was then applied to derailment. 
First, an intercept-only model was fitted in which only the mean and the variance of the intercept 
factor were estimated, and the residuals of the indicators were equated over time. Although the 
traditional chi-square test indicated that the model did not fit the data (see Table 3), other fit 
statistics indicated that the intercept-only model for derailment was adequate. This trend was 
observed across each model extension (i.e., both the linear, and linear plus auto-regressive 
models). Regarding formal tests of improvement in model fit, the linear model for derailment did 
not fit significantly better than the intercept-only model (χ2Δ(3) = 6.32, p = .097) and the 
autoregressive model did not  fit significantly better than the linear model (χ2Δ(3) = 7.62, p = 
.055).  
 
Table 3.  
Univariate Latent Growth Models for Depression and Derailment 
Notes: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Fit Index; AIC = 
Akaike Information Criterion; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
 
Given that these models all appear to fit the data similarly, a decision was made to 
interpret the intercept-only model for derailment. Even though the AIC did not favor this model, 
 χ2 df 
CFI 
(TLI) 
AIC  BIC RMSEA SRMR 
Depression        
  Intercept-only 213.41*** 11 .79 (.88) 13040.25 13054.45 0.15 0.14 
  Linear Model 80.13*** 8 .92 (.94) 12912.97 12941.36 0.10 0.07 
  Linear Model with Auto-regressions 21.70** 5 .98 (.98) 12860.55 12903.12 0.06 0.03 
Derailment        
  Intercept-only 25.26** 11 .98 (.99) 3200.19 3214.47 0.04 0.08 
  Linear Model 18.94** 8 .99 (.99) 3199.87 3228.44 0.04 0.09 
  Linear Model with Auto-regressions 11.32* 5 .99 (.99) 3198.25 3241.10 0.04 0.07 
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it did have the lowest Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) of any of the nested models. Within 
the intercept-only model, derailment’s intercept factor evidenced significant mean (𝜇?̂? = 3.21, SE 
= 0.20) and variance (𝜓?̂? = 0.28, SE = 0.02) parameters, indicating an average non-zero starting 
value for derailment and possibly non-trivial variability in overall derailment scores across the 
sample. 
Preregistered Hypothesis Testing 
 Preparing the ALT-SR. In preparing the autoregressive latent trajectory model with 
structured residuals (ALT-SR) for hypothesis testing consistent with the preregistration, parallel 
problems with model specification and the removal of influential outliers were encountered. In 
constructing the model according to the preregistered plan, several errors occurred during 
estimation of this model. When estimated, as registered, the variance-covariance parameters 
were negative resulting in a non-positive definite matrix of latent parameters associated with the 
latent factors. This estimation error led to issues with using the faoutlier package and 
Generalized Cook’s D function for identification of influential outliers.  
To improve convergence, the structure of the model was addressed. Given that the 
univariate LGM analyses suggested that an intercept-only structure was best-fitting for 
derailment’s trajectory, a decision was made to remove derailment’s slope factor from the ALT-
SR. After doing so, the model was left with six elements in the  latent variance-covariance 
matrix: Derailment’s intercept variance, depression’s intercept variance, depression’s slope 
variance, the covariance of derailment’s intercept with depression’s intercept, the covariance of 
derailment’s intercept with depression’s slope, and the covariance of depression’s intercept with 
depression’s slope. When the problems with the latent covariance matrix continued to persist, the 
variances and covariances of the remaining latent factors were sequentially constrained to zero 
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until the model converged without errors. In the final model, the only freed latent variance-
covariance component that remained was derailment’s intercept variance. 
With the issues involving the latent variance-covariance matrix seemingly resolved, the 
identification of influential outliers took place. Several attempts were made to adhere to the 
preregistration and utilize the faoutlier package; however, results suggested the removal of 
hundreds of cases (and greatly attenuating power). In light of this, a method of identifying 
outlying cases that would afford greater control and more evidence was sought. Ultimately, the 
strategy for outlier identification shifted from using the faoutlier package to the manual 
calculation and identification of outliers using dfbetas estimates for each of the 28 estimated 
parameters in the resultant ALT-SR model. Dfbetas are estimated by running the model many 
times, each time excluding one single case. The dfbetas are then calculated by subtracting a 
given coefficient estimate for a model with the case from the resultant coefficient for a model 
with the case excluded, then dividing the difference score by the standard error of the coefficient 
with the model removed. Standard thresholds for dfbetas are either |1.0| or sample-sized based 
thresholds determined by 2/sqrt(n) (in this case, 2/sqrt[937] = |.065|). Given that the sample-sized 
based threshold would have again resulted in the removal of hundreds of cases, a subjective 
threshold, |0.5|, was chosen to exclude influential outliers. With this threshold in place, a total of 
11 cases were identified as potentially influential and were thus removed before running the 
modified ALT-SR. 
Testing the ALT-SR. After removing the failed attention checks, the 11 outlying cases, 
and the empty rows in the data, a total of 853 cases were used by the lavaan package to estimate 
the modified ALT-SR. The modified ALT-SR differs from the originally preregistered ALT-SR 
only in the sense that (a) the linear slope factor for derailment was removed and (b) most of the 
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latent variance components were constrained to zero except for derailment’s intercept. Without 
these changes, the interpretation of the model would have been precarious. The fit indices of this 
adjusted model suggested mediocre match between the proposed theory and the data: χ2(16) = 
78.91, p < .001; CFI = .97, TLI = .94; SRMR = .10; RMSEA = .07, 90% CI [.05, 0.08], p of 
Close Fit (pClose; RMSEA ≤ .05) = .022; BIC = 15584.89, AIC = 15451.93. While both the CFI 
and the RMSEA technically met the thresholds designated in the Analytical Strategy and 
preregistration of this study, several of the fit indices did not. For consistency with the 
preregistration, unstandardized path coefficients are reported in Table 4; however, because of the 
disagreement among the fit statistics, these estimates should be interpreted with caution. 
Substantive interpretation of the findings will follow exploratory respecification of the model 
based on the modification indices. 
 
Table 4.  
Initial Autoregressive Latent Trajectory Model with Structured Residuals 
 
Unstd. Coefficient 
Estimate 
S.E. z-value p-value 
 
Autoregressive Stability 
 
Derailment, W1 to 2 
Derailment, W2 to 3 
Derailment, W3 to 4 
 
Depression, W1 to 2 
Depression, W2 to 3 
Depression, W3 to 4 
 
 
 
-.06 
-.04 
-.06 
 
.84 
.83 
.92 
 
 
 
.01 
.01 
.01 
 
.04 
.03 
.05 
 
 
 
-5.17 
-3.34 
-5.22 
 
20.99 
25.54 
20.26 
 
 
 
< .001 
.001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
     
Crossed Effects 
 
Derailment W1 predicts Depression W2 
Derailment W2 predicts Depression W3 
Derailment W3 predicts Depression W4 
 
Depression W1 predicts Derailment W2 
Depression W2 predicts Derailment W3 
Depression W3 predicts Derailment W4 
 
 
-.63 
-.75 
.56 
 
.02 
.01 
.02 
 
 
.17 
.28 
.40 
 
.004 
.003 
.003 
 
 
-3.66 
-2.71 
1.40 
 
4.94 
4.07 
6.02 
 
 
< .001 
.007 
.163 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
     
Covariances 
 
Derailment W1 with Depression W1 
Derailment W2 with Depression W2 
 
 
.68 
.54 
 
 
.14 
.12 
 
 
4.68 
4.45 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
48 
 
 
Notes. All estimates are unstandardized. W = Wave 
Depression’s intercept and slope were fixed to zero. Thus, variances and covarainces involving these terms will be 
zero. 
 
Unregistered Exploratory Analyses 
Autoregressive Cross-Lagged Panel Model. Given the less-than-ideal fit indices 
evidenced by the initial ALT-SR model, modification indices were examined to get a sense of 
where the source of misfit was located. In particular, it was noted that the variance components 
of the latent structure were a large source of model misfit. With these problems signaled by the 
modification indices, an exploratory autoregressive cross-lagged panel (ACLP) model was 
employed in an attempt to examine the reciprocal nature of the constructs, while circumventing 
the latent structure of the ALT-SR. Similar to the ALT-SR, majority of fit indices suggested that 
the model evidenced inadequate fit: χ2(12) = 125.20, p < .001; CFI = .94, TLI = .85; SRMR = 
.06; RMSEA = .11, 90% CI [.09, 0.12], pClose < .001; BIC = 15658.17, AIC = 15506.21. 
Unstandardized path coefficients for the ACLP are reported in Table 5. 
 
 
Derailment W3 with Depression W3 
Derailment W4 with Depression W4 
.22 
.25 
.11 
.14 
2.06 
1.79 
.040 
.073 
     
Intercepts 
 
Derailment Intercept 
Depression Intercept 
Depression Slope 
 
 
3.23 
7.36 
-2.34 
 
 
.02 
.24 
.41 
 
 
136.97 
30.88 
-5.70 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
     
Variances 
 
Derailment Intercept 
     Derailment W1 
     Derailment W2 
     Derailment W3 
     Derailment W4 
 
Depression Intercept 
Depression Slope 
     Depression W1 
     Depression W2 
     Depression W3 
     Depression W4 
 
 
.28 
.17 
.13 
.12 
.11 
 
 
 
44.53 
32.01 
19.71 
35.34 
 
 
.017 
.013 
.012 
.013 
.012 
 
 
 
2.29 
2.13 
1.61 
3.09 
 
 
16.04 
12.50 
10.29 
9.41 
8.96 
 
 
 
19.43 
15.04 
12.22 
11.42 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
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Table 5.  
Initial Exploratory Autoregressive Cross-Lagged Panel Model 
 
Bivariate Latent Growth Curve. At the suggestion of a consultant (P. Curran, personal 
communication, July 9-19, 2017) given the issues with fitting the original ALT-SR model, a 
 
Unstd. Coefficient 
Estimate 
S.E. z-value p-value 
 
Autoregressive Stability 
 
Derailment, W1 to 2 
Derailment, W2 to 3 
Derailment, W3 to 4 
 
Depression, W1 to 2 
Depression, W2 to 3 
Depression, W3 to 4 
 
 
 
.67 
.77 
.68 
 
.85 
.83 
.93 
 
 
 
.03 
.04 
.04 
 
.04 
.03 
.05 
 
 
 
19.47 
20.87 
18.13 
 
21.30 
25.29 
20.45 
 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
     
Crossed Effects 
 
Derailment W1 predicts Depression W2 
Derailment W2 predicts Depression W3 
Derailment W3 predicts Depression W4 
 
Depression W1 predicts Derailment W2 
Depression W2 predicts Derailment W3 
Depression W3 predicts Derailment W4 
 
 
.615 
-.619 
-.221 
 
.010 
.001 
.009 
 
 
.40 
.40 
.58 
 
.004 
.003 
.003 
 
 
1.53 
-1.54 
-0.38 
 
2.82 
0.19 
2.75 
 
 
.125 
.124 
.703 
 
.005 
.846 
.006 
     
Covariances 
 
Derailment W1 with Depression W1 
Derailment W2 with Depression W2 
Derailment W3 with Depression W3 
Derailment W4 with Depression W4 
 
 
.86 
.49 
.25 
.26 
 
 
.16 
.13 
.11 
.15 
 
 
5.45 
3.80 
2.30 
1.74 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
.022 
.082 
     
Intercepts 
 
Derailment W1 
Derailment W2 
Derailment W3 
Derailment W4 
 
Depression W1 
Depression W2 
Depression W3 
Depression W4 
 
 
3.23 
0.92 
0.76 
0.92 
 
7.51 
0.82 
2.30 
2.85 
 
 
.02 
.11 
.11 
.12 
 
0.24 
1.30 
1.21 
1.80 
 
 
142.02 
8.31 
6.78 
7.80 
 
31.32 
0.63 
1.90 
1.57 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
.530 
.058 
.115 
     
Variances 
 
Derailment W1 
Derailment W2 
Derailment W3 
Derailment W4 
 
Depression W1 
Depression W2 
Depression W3 
Depression W4 
 
 
0.41 
0.24 
0.19 
0.16 
 
44.47 
31.32 
19.69 
35.07 
 
 
.021 
.016 
.015 
.014 
 
2.29 
2.08 
1.61 
3.07 
 
 
19.74 
15.32 
12.90 
11.85 
 
19.46 
15.07 
12.23 
11.44 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
50 
 
 
standard bivariate latent growth curve (bivariate LGC) was also constructed to examine the 
parallel growth of both depression and derailment over time. The main difference between the 
ALT-SR and a bivariate LGC is the presence of structured crossover effects. In the bivariate 
LGC, the latent components and residuals between the two variables are allowed to covary but 
there are no predictions from one variable to the other.  
In the bivariate LGC, derailment’s slope factor was again excluded from the model, but 
the other latent components (derailment’s intercept, depression’s intercept, and depression’s 
slope) were allowed to covary. Like all latent growth models, the means of the four manifest 
depression and derailment scores were fixed to zero, and the variance components of these 
manifests were constrained to equate over time. The covariances among the residuals of 
depression and derailment at each wave were constrained to be equate over time as well. This 
bivariate LGC evidenced largely acceptable model fit statistics. Although the chi-square test of 
global fit was significant (χ2[26] = 71.41, p < .001), other indices of fit reached acceptable 
thresholds: CFI = .98, TLI = .97; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.03, 0.06], pClose = 
.716; BIC = 15509.92, AIC = 15452.75.  
With regard to the specific unstandardized parameter values, the only significant 
covariance between depression and derailment’s latent structure was between depression’s 
intercept and derailment’s intercept (ψis = 0.89, SE = 0.14, p < .001). This positive covariance 
indicates that those with higher initial starting derailment scores tended to have higher initial 
starting depression scores as well. Derailment’s intercept factor evidenced significant mean (𝜇?̂? = 
3.23, SE = 0.20) and variance (𝜓?̂? = 0.29, SE = 0.02) estimates, indicating an average non-zero 
starting value for derailment coupled with potentially non-trivial variance around that starting 
value. Although depression’s intercept value evidenced similarly significant mean (𝜇?̂? = 7.50, SE 
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= 0.24) and variance (𝜓?̂? = 28.81, SE = 2.74) estimates, its slope component did not (𝜇?̂? = .39, SE 
= 0.43, p = .371; 𝜓?̂? = 2.09, SE = 1.18, p = .077). The covariation between the residual 
components of depression and derailment was significant (cov = .17, SE = .05, p = .001). 
Finally, with regard to the specific regressions among the manifest variables, depression 
was only found to significantly predict itself from Wave 1 to Wave 2 (b = .16, SE = .06, p = 
.009). Derailment, on the other hand, evidenced significant and negative prediction of itself from 
Wave 1 to Wave 2 (b = -.02, SE = .01, p = .007). All other time-adjacent auto-regressions fell 
above thresholds for significance (all remaining p’s ≥ .08). 
Empirically-directed Respecification Attempts. Following the modification indices for 
the respective models, the ALT-SR and the ACLP were respecified. This was done in an effort to 
ascertain better-fitting models, respectively. 
ALT-SR. With regard to the ALT-SR, the modification indices of the original model 
were again consulted. Among the latent components that were presenting as an issue for the 
growth of derailment, freeing the derailment’s Wave 1 intercept appeared to be the most 
parsimonious way to improve overall model fit. Noting that derailment’s trajectory was 
problematic, how to free derailment’s Wave 1 intercept was determined with a series of latent 
growth models comparing fit and examining the plots of the estimated trajectories against the 
actual observed means. A visualization overlaying the various latent growth curves over the 
individual derailment trajectories can be found in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Latent Growth Curves of Derailment's Trajectory. Notes: The green line represents the 
observed means, the purple line represents means estimated from an intercept-only model, the 
orange line represent means estimated from a model with a knot-point at Wave 1, the maroon 
line represents the estimated means from a latent basis model, and the blue line represents the 
means estimated from a linear model. 
 
 From the plots, it became clear that the intercept-only and the trajectory including a knot-
point between Waves 1 and 2 (created by a second slope factor with loadings at λt = 1, 0, 0, 0) 
were the closest-matching to the actual observed means of derailment across the study. To 
determine which trajectory was most appropriate, a series of Likelihood Ratio Tests (LRTs) were 
conducted with various knot-points evaluated against the intercept-only model. This testing of 
various trajectory fits can be found in Table 6. 
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Table 6.  
Derailment intercept-only and knot model comparisons. 
Model 
BIC 
(AIC) 
χ2 
χ2Δ 
Preceding Model 
χ2Δ 
Intercept-only 
Intercept-Only 
3114.13 
(3085.64) 
22.28(8), p = .004   
Knot between 
W1 and W2 
3114.32 
(3071.58) 
2.23(5), p = .817 20.05(3), p < .001  
Knot between 
W2 and W3 
3127.77 
(3085.04) 
15.68(5), p = .008 13.45(0), p < .001⁺ 6.60(3), p = .086 
Knot between 
W3 and W4 
3129.23 
(3086.49 
17.14(5), p = .004 1.46(0), p < .001⁺ 5.14(3), p = .162 
Notes.*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .001 
Chi-square change implies change from immediately preceding model. 
⁺ indicates that the model fits significantly different, but worse than specified or preceding 
model. 
 
 From this exploration of derailment’s trajectory, it became clear that a model featuring a 
knot-point between Waves 1 and 2 was the best-fitting solution for derailment’s course. 
Derailment’s average trajectory appeared to begin relatively elevated. A decrease was observed 
from Waves 1 to 2, but then from Waves 2 through 4, the trajectory of derailment appeared 
rather stable. With this new knot-point representing a viable slope factor, the ALT-SR was 
reconstructed. Initially, allowing the variance components of the new derailment knotted 
trajectory resulted in a model with a non-positive-definite variance-covariance matrix. The 
variance of the derailment knotted slope component was then constrained to zero as a result. The 
linear model for depression was retained, and the variance components of depression’s intercept 
and slope remained fixed to zero. The resultant model evidenced adequate overall model fit: 
χ2(15) = 57.77, p < .001; CFI = .98, TLI = .96; SRMR = .06; RMSEA = .06, 90% CI [.04, 0.07], 
pClose = .189; BIC = 15570.50, AIC = 15432.79. 
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Table 7.  
Modified Autoregressive Latent Trajectory Model with Structured Residuals 
Notes. All estimates are unstandardized. W = Wave. 
* Denotes added parameter that deviates from the preregistration. 
 
  
 
Unstd. Coefficient 
Estimate 
S.E. z-value p-value 
 
Autoregressive Stability 
 
Derailment, W1 to 2 
Derailment, W2 to 3 
Derailment, W3 to 4 
 
Depression, W1 to 2 
Depression, W2 to 3 
Depression, W3 to 4 
 
 
 
.09 
.11 
.09 
 
.84 
.83 
.92 
 
 
 
.04 
.04 
.04 
 
.04 
.03 
.05 
 
 
 
2.51 
2.90 
2.48 
 
21.03 
25.53 
20.21 
 
 
 
.012 
.004 
.013 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
     
Crossed Effects 
 
Derailment W1 predicts Depression W2 
Derailment W2 predicts Depression W3 
Derailment W3 predicts Depression W4 
 
Depression W1 predicts Derailment W2 
Depression W2 predicts Derailment W3 
Depression W3 predicts Derailment W4 
 
 
-.60 
-.67 
.67 
 
.02 
.01 
.02 
 
 
.17 
.27 
.39 
 
.004 
.003 
.003 
 
 
-3.51 
-2.46 
1.71 
 
5.10 
3.86 
5.89 
 
 
< .001 
.014 
.087 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
     
Covariances 
 
Derailment W1 with Depression W1 
Derailment W2 with Depression W2 
Derailment W3 with Depression W3 
Derailment W4 with Depression W4 
 
 
.77 
.54 
.24 
.27 
 
 
.15 
.13 
.11 
.14 
 
 
5.30 
4.30 
2.21 
1.93 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
.027 
.053 
     
Intercepts 
 
Derailment Intercept 
*Derailment Knot Slope 
Depression Intercept 
Depression Slope 
 
 
2.73 
.50 
7.40 
-2.48 
 
 
.02 
.02 
.24 
.40 
 
 
23.82 
4.34 
31.04 
-6.13 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
     
Variances 
 
Derailment Intercept 
*Derailment Knotted Slope 
     Derailment W1 
     Derailment W2 
     Derailment W3 
     Derailment W4 
 
Depression Intercept 
Depression Slope 
     Depression W1 
     Depression W2 
     Depression W3 
     Depression W4 
 
 
.22 
0.0 
.19 
.14 
.13 
.10 
 
0.0 
0.0 
44.53 
31.94 
19.68 
35.44 
 
 
.02 
 
.02 
.01 
.01 
.01 
 
 
 
2.29 
2.12 
1.61 
3.11 
 
 
10.64 
 
11.83 
10.31 
9.30 
8.57 
 
 
 
19.43 
15.05 
12.23 
11.41 
 
 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
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Given that this is an empirically-driven respecification of the model, the results of this 
model should be interpreted as entirely exploratory in nature; however, the coefficients estimated 
here were still evaluated and interpreted with the study hypotheses in mind. Further, given that 
this model is still an ALT-SR, the interpretation of the prospective paths are evaluated at the 
within-person level. Hence, directional path estimates represent whether an individual’s 
deviation from his or her own average score at timek can predict subsequent deviation at timek+1.  
Concerning the latent matrix, covariances between depression and derailment’s intercept 
and slope parameters were not observed. With the exception of derailment’s intercept variance, 
all other variance parameters were fixed to zero to preclude a non-positive definite matrix. 
Hence, the covariances among the parameters were all inherently zero (since anything multiplied 
by zero is zero). As the only remaining parameter observed, derailment’s intercept variance was 
indeed significant (𝜓?̂? = 0.22, SE = 0.02) indicating potentially meaningful variability around the 
average start-point. With regard to the means of the estimated latent variables, both derailment’s 
intercept (𝜇?̂? = 2.73, SE = 0.02) and slope (𝜇?̂? = 0.50, SE = 0.02), as well as depression’s 
intercept (𝜇?̂? = 7.40, SE = 0.24) and slope (𝜇?̂? = -2.48, SE = 0.40) were significant. Hence, with 
regard to derailment, participant scores evidenced a significant average non-zero starting value 
and a significant average slope from Wave 1 to Wave 2. Similarly, with regard to depression, 
participant scores evidenced a significant average non-zero starting value and a significant 
average slope across the study. 
With regard to certain path coefficients, the residuals of both depression and derailment 
evidenced significant autoregressive stability over time. That is, deviations from one’s mean 
trajectory of depression and derailment were able to significantly and positively predict 
successive deviations, respectively, from one observation to the next. Further, depression and 
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derailment evidenced significant and positive covariation when evaluated cross-sectionally at 
most waves. Thus, an individual who tended to be high on derailment relative to their own mean 
derailment score, also tended to be elevated on depression relative to their own mean depression 
score. Finally, with regard to the crossed effects, derailment significantly and negatively 
predicted depression between Waves 1 and 2, and Waves 2 and 3. From Wave 3 to Wave 4, 
however, the prediction was not significant. With respect to depression’s capacity to predict 
derailment downstream, depression significantly and positively predicted derailment from each 
observation to the next. 
ACLP. With regard to the ACLP respecification, nonsensical (e.g., an earlier time point 
being predicted by a later time point) regression parameters and covariances suggested in the 
modification indices were skipped. The remaining modification indices pointed to the addition of 
longer lags being needed in the model. In total, four additional lagged regressions were added to 
force the model to fit adequately: Derailment at Wave 4 being predicted by derailment at both 
Waves 1 and 2, Derailment at Wave 3 being predicted by derailment at Wave 1, and Depression 
at Wave 4 being predicted by Depression at Wave 2. With these additions, the model fit the data 
well: χ2(8) = 16.08, p = .041; CFI = 1.00, TLI = .98; SRMR = .02; RMSEA = .03, 90% CI [.01, 
0.06], pClose = .838; BIC = 15576.05, AIC = 15405.10. Table 8 displays the individual path 
coefficients of this revised model. 
Again, given the exploratory nature of this respecification, the paths here must be 
interpreted cautiously. Further, because residual values are not specified within the ACLP 
framework, the effects here must be interpreted as average, or between-person, effects. 
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Table 8.  
Modified Exploratory Autoregressive Cross-Lagged Panel Model 
Notes. * Denotes added lag. 
 
Unstd. Coefficient 
Estimate 
S.E. z-value p-value 
 
Autoregressive Stability 
 
Derailment, W1 to 2 
Derailment, W2 to 3 
Derailment, W3 to 4 
 
*Derailment, W2 to 4 
*Derailment, W1 to 3 
*Derailment, W1 to 4 
 
Depression, W1 to 2 
Depression, W2 to 3 
Depression, W3 to 4 
 
*Depression, W2 to 4 
 
 
 
.65 
.56 
.36 
 
.29 
.28 
.17 
 
.85 
.81 
.55 
 
.46 
 
 
 
.04 
.05 
.06 
 
.05 
.05 
.05 
 
.04 
.03 
.08 
 
.09 
 
 
 
16.56 
10.74 
6.01 
 
4.72 
5.54 
3.36 
 
21.40 
23.78 
6.26 
 
5.29 
 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
.001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
     
Crossed Effects 
 
Derailment W1 predicts Depression W2 
Derailment W2 predicts Depression W3 
Derailment W3 predicts Depression W4 
 
Depression W1 predicts Derailment W2 
Depression W2 predicts Derailment W3 
Depression W3 predicts Derailment W4 
 
 
.57 
-.54 
-.80 
 
.01 
.00 
.01 
 
 
.40 
.42 
.58 
 
.004 
.003 
.003 
 
 
1.43 
-1.28 
-1.37 
 
2.77 
0.35 
2.78 
 
 
.154 
.199 
.169 
 
< .001 
.727 
.005 
     
Covariances 
 
Derailment W1 with Depression W1 
Derailment W2 with Depression W2 
Derailment W3 with Depression W3 
Derailment W4 with Depression W4 
 
 
.85 
.51 
.21 
.23 
 
 
.16 
.13 
.11 
.13 
 
 
5.40 
3.80 
1.86 
1.74 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
.063 
.082 
     
Intercepts 
 
Derailment W1 
Derailment W2 
Derailment W3 
Derailment W4 
 
Depression W1 
Depression W2 
Depression W3 
Depression W4 
 
 
3.23 
0.99 
0.51 
0.49 
 
7.51 
0.96 
2.18 
3.44 
 
 
.02 
.11 
.12 
.13 
 
0.23 
1.29 
1.25 
1.78 
 
 
142.56 
8.72 
4.14 
3.94 
 
31.36 
0.74 
1.75 
1.93 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
.458 
.081 
.054 
     
Variances 
 
Derailment W1 
Derailment W2 
Derailment W3 
Derailment W4 
 
Depression W1 
Depression W2 
Depression W3 
Depression W4 
 
 
0.41 
0.24 
0.18 
0.14 
 
44.43 
31.46 
20.04 
33.23 
 
 
.021 
.016 
.014 
.012 
 
2.28 
2.09 
1.67 
2.89 
 
 
19.77 
15.07 
12.54 
11.92 
 
19.48 
15.09 
12.02 
11.52 
 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
< .001 
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 In the modified ACLP, both depression and derailment again evidenced significant and 
positive autoregressive stability indicating, once again, that the group mean at one observation 
significantly and positively predicts its location at the next observation. With regard to their 
covariation, the relations between depression and derailment at Waves 1 and 2 were both 
significant and positive. While the covariations at Waves 3 and 4 remained positive, the trend 
does not reach traditional significance thresholds. Finally, the crossed effects indicated that 
derailment did not significantly predict depression downstream across any time-adjacent 
observations. Depression, however, significantly and positively predicted downstream 
derailment from Waves 1 to 2, and from Waves 3 to 4. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The intent of the present study was binary in nature. First, this study sought to replicate 
and expound upon the findings of Burrow, Hill, Ratner, and Fuller-Rowell (2017) by showing 
that the experience of derailment can reliably predict subsequent depressive symptomatology. 
Second, this study questioned whether depression could then, in turn, predict derailment. If true, 
a depression-derailment feedback loop would be established. Providing a backdrop for the 
cyclical nature of these two constructs was also the notion of college matriculation as a time for 
the dynamic interplay of well-being and ongoing self-refinement. With these contextual 
circumstances in mind, a depression-derailment feedback loop could bring with it several 
implications. Not only would researchers have new insight into the development and 
maintenance of depression, but exciting new targets for future intervention would also be made 
visible. This new information could be especially helpful for those interested in facilitating 
individuals through critical life transitions. 
 The first major contribution of the current work concerns derailment. The present study 
was the first to observe derailment beyond two occasions, allowing for a more detailed picture of 
derailment’s course. Contrary to expectations, derailment did not follow a linear trajectory 
whereby phenomena show consistent increase or decrease over time. Instead, the best-fitting 
model for derailment was one with a change in the trajectory over the period of observation: The 
average person in this study appeared to experience a slight decrease in derailment during the 
first semester of the academic year, followed by a plateau. One explanation for why this occurred 
is derived from the meaning maintenance model (MMM; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). The 
MMM posits that when presented with unexpected information, individuals act quickly to project 
meaning onto accessible areas in a restorative process known as fluid compensation. When an 
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individual enters college, or begins a new academic year, their experience may not conform to 
expectations. Indeed, leaving home for the first time, or returning to college after spending 
nearly three months at home, can be a jarring experience. Thus, derailment may be highest 
immediately after arriving to campus. In an effort to restore meaning, people may cast sense onto 
their feelings of identity and the perceived continuity thereof. Once a period of adjustment has 
passed, one may expect no further fluctuations in derailment for the average person because 
there are no longer violations in their expectancies. No matter the mechanism, knowing that a 
traditional linear model is not ideal for the trajectory of derailment over time is an important first 
step for the scholarly community toward continuing to build derailment’s theoretical framework.  
 With regard to depression’s univariate trajectory, very little change was observed for the 
average person across the study. This relative stability of untreated depressive symptoms has 
been observed in prior literature on the topic (Lovibond, 1998; Tanaka & Huba, 1987; Tram & 
Cole, 2006). Further, the descriptive statistics of depression across the sample indicated that the 
vast majority of scores were well-within the range of normal mood fluctuation. Although a 
positively-trending linear growth function was the best-fitting type of growth for depression 
(indicating that, on average, an individual tends to experience more depressive symptoms with 
the passage of time), this slope component failed to reach the threshold for significance. Reasons 
for this could include the fact that data for the present study were collected at the beginning and 
end of two sequential college semesters which included final exams. During exam periods, an 
uptick in “depressive-like” symptoms is reasonable. Experiences such as loss of sleep, changes 
in appetite, and feelings of worthlessness could all be products of the stress felt when exams are 
approaching. Hence, a stable, but modestly positive, trend for the depressive symptoms is 
unsurprising. 
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 Because this work was the first to chart derailment’s course, the original model as it was 
preregistered (i.e., with derailment containing a linear slope component) was not viable. In order 
to answer the questions posed by this thesis, however, an exploratory respecified ALT-SR model 
was called upon to tentatively discuss the study’s hypotheses. First, it was hypothesized that both 
depression and derailment would evidence significant stability over the course of the study and, 
indeed, initial evidence for this hypothesis was found. That is, both depression and derailment 
reliably predicted themselves from one wave to the next. Second, it was hypothesized that 
depression and derailment would significantly and positively be associated with one another at 
each observation. Indeed, within-wave, depression and derailment were significantly and 
positively related. This was true across the study with the exception of Wave 4, where the 
association between depression and derailment fell short of statistical significance. Importantly, 
since these tests were completed at the within-person level of analysis, the substantive 
interpretation of these findings suggests that for any given individual relative to their own mean 
trajectory of either depression or derailment, (a) elevated levels of one construct were able to 
predict elevated levels of the same construct at subsequent waves and (b) elevated levels of one 
construct were able to positively predict elevated levels of the other construct within the same 
wave. By and large, these findings support the first set of hypotheses purported at the outset of 
this paper. All in all, evidence is so far consistent with many of the studies presented in Burrow, 
Hill, Ratner, & Fuller-Rowell (2017): Derailment, as a measure, not only demonstrates test-retest 
reliability, but sensing derailment tends to be associated with experiencing more depressive 
symptoms at the same point in time.  
Next, the crossed effects for depression and derailment over time were evaluated to test 
the reciprocal hypotheses. First, it was evaluated whether depressive symptoms predicted 
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subsequent and contiguous levels of derailment. It was hypothesized that the prospective 
association between depression and derailment would be positive and significant in nature. 
Across all time-adjacent waves of the study, depression indeed significantly and positively 
predicted successive reporting of derailment. These results are bolstered by the within-person 
nature of the analyses because systematic relations between depression and derailment are 
controlled in the ALT-SR model. In other words, these prospective relations between the 
variables are not simply due to between-person differences in rank-order; rather, these are 
average, time-specific deviations from individuals’ norms (Berry & Willoughby, 2016). Within 
the proposed framework, this translates to preliminary evidence that being higher than one 
normally is with regard to depressive symptoms predicts that one tends to feel like they are more 
off-course than usual at a later point in time. These findings, although exploratory, leverage 
support for the claim that derailment is sensitive to the experience of increased depressive 
symptoms. 
Finally, with respect to the conceptual replication of Burrow, Hill, Ratner, and Fuller-
Rowell (2017) and the final piece to the proposed depression-derailment feedback loop, it was 
hypothesized that derailment would positively predict subsequent depression. While derailment 
was able to significantly predict depression from Waves 1 to 2, and 2 to 3 in the present study, 
the prospective associations were negative. That is, for an individual scoring relatively high on 
derailment at a given time point, their subsequent level of depression tended to be relatively low. 
In the final crossed effect for this association, the prospective relation between derailment at 
Wave 3 and depression at Wave 4 was positive, although, this estimate was not statistically 
significant.  
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Overall, these findings on the prospective association between derailment and depression 
are not only unexpected, but in direct opposition to that which was purported by Burrow and his 
colleagues (2017). Several possibilities could explain these discrepant findings. For one, this 
disagreement could be attributable to the differences between the studies in unit of time. Burrow 
and his colleagues used a lag of nine months whereas the present study’s lag was only around 
three months between observations. A longer period of time may be needed for derailment to 
positively predict depressive symptoms. Another possible explanation for this discrepancy is 
offered by King and Hicks (2007). The idea of possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986) is 
arguably a near-neighbor of derailment – if derailment is the sense that one has gotten “off 
course,” then that lost course must be cognitively represented in some way by the person who 
senses derailment. Remaining engaged with a lost possible self tends to be related to negative 
well-being correlates like regret and distress (King & Raspin, 2004; King & Smith, 2004; 
Wrosch, Bauer, & Scheier, 2005), but King and Hicks contend that lost possible selves offer a 
fallow space for formative opportunities. In earlier studies, elaborating on a lost possible self was 
related to heightened ego development (King & Smith, 2004) and sensed growth (King & 
Patterson, 2000) – components that King and Hicks suggest are important for maturity, 
complexity, and happiness. These ideas are not without merit: For decades, it has been noted that 
the ability to be reasonably flexible with one’s goals is ideal for subjective well-being (Klinger, 
1975, 1977), and disengagement from dead ends can be associated with lower regret intensity 
(Wrosch et al., 2005). Although painful at first, being able to “cut one’s losses” is an important 
first step toward commitment to new, more plausible goals and subsequent well-being. This 
process of disengagement and recovery is perhaps expedited within the college environment, 
where opportunities for individuals to conjure new possible selves are abound, ergo, blunting 
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derailment’s deleterious effects. Indeed, from King and Hicks’ perspective, “The happy and 
complex person acknowledges fully a past characterized by loss but is also deeply engaged in the 
present” (p. 630). This possible explanation for the curious inverse effect of derailment on 
subsequent depressive symptoms opens several doors for future research, to be discussed shortly. 
Limitations 
 Insofar as the confirmatory tests of the present study, testing and interpreting the 
feedback model as it was originally proposed gave rise to several issues. Ultimately, 
modification indices were used to ascertain the derailment trajectory since no work to date has 
examined derailment beyond two time points. Although following the suggestions of 
modification indices can lead researchers to a better-fitting model, it is important to keep in mind 
that such guidance is at the expense of Type I error control (Kline, 2015). Modification indices 
are derived in a sequential, data-dependent manner, resulting in suggestions that contain dozens 
of error potentials. Thus, corrections for Type I error inflation after turning to modification 
indices in a structural equation model “…are really just Band-Aids on flesh wounds” (F. 
Thoemmes, personal communication, August 20, 2017). Given that psychological findings are 
laden with false positives (Ioannidis, 2005; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), it would be 
reckless not to underscore the need for replication of the presented model. Readers should 
interpret the present study’s findings as exploratory in nature, but still instrumental to laying 
down the foundation to this field of inquiry. If researchers are interested in the premise of this 
model, confirmatory studies must be conducted before any theory surrounding the association 
between depression and derailment can truly advance. 
 Moreover, future researchers should consider replicating the present study using a sample 
that contains clinical participants or, at the very least, a sample of individuals that represent a 
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broader range of depressive symptoms. As evidenced by the histograms, depression scores were 
quite positively skewed. With data that is so densely populated at the lower range of depression 
scores, it is possible that the present study suffers from a statistical limitation known as 
restriction of range. This restriction of range could very well result in the suppression of 
correlates (e.g., Sackett & Yang, 2000), in addition to providing a murky picture of what the 
relation between depression and derailment looks like at the uppermost levels of depression. 
 A third limitation of the present study is one that is inherent to most – if not all – 
longitudinal designs (Graham, 2009), yet is still consistently under-addressed in the field of 
developmental psychology (Nicholson, Deboeck, Howard, 2017). Between Wave 1 and Wave 4, 
this study experienced roughly 56% attrition at the measurement-occasion level (i.e., participants 
at the beginning of the study who did not return for subsequent waves). Given this high rate of 
attrition, some explanation of missing data mechanisms is warranted. Why data are missing can 
bias the present study’s results (Little & Rubin, 1989) just as much as those who enroll/stay in 
longitudinal studies can leave researchers vulnerable to bias as a result of non-random self-
selection (Goodman & Blum, 1996; Rubin, 1976). Little and Rubin (1989) describe three ways 
data comes to be missing. First, data can be missing completely at random (MCAR), whereby 
missingness is not related to any variable that is observed or unobserved (e.g., a research 
assistant drops a set of responses on the way to code them). Second, data can be missing at 
random (MAR) whereby missingness can be explained by a variable that is observed elsewhere 
in the data (e.g., conscientiousness [if personality traits are being observed on the survey] can 
predict those who accidentally skip other items in the survey). Finally, data can be missing not at 
random (MNAR), whereby missingness on a given item is driven by the item content itself (e.g., 
a participant with a high body mass index fails to fill out questions relevant to their height and 
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weight), or when the correlate of the missingness is otherwise unknown or simply not measured. 
Under conditions of MCAR and MAR, missing data methods like Multiple Imputation and Full 
Information Likelihood Estimation can help attenuate bias; however, under conditions of 
MNAR, unbiased parameter estimates can never be achieved because the correlate of the 
missingness can never be accounted for in the analysis (Enders, 2010). It is entirely possible that 
students who were the most depressed were those who either (a) did not enroll in the study, (b) 
did not return to the study, or (c) skipped some/all depression items. It is also possible that 
because data collection occurred during peak times of activity in the semester (i.e., at the 
beginning, when students are still adjusting to their schedules, and at the end, when students are 
preparing for final exams) many students simply did not have time, were simply too stressed, or 
not incentivized enough to participate in non-class activities. Thus, the present study’s missing 
data mechanism could very well be MNAR since there is no accounting for these potential 
correlates. With all this being said, there is hope in the fact that missing data is often due to a 
combination of mechanisms within a single dataset (Graham, 2012). If this is true for the present 
dataset, the chosen method of estimation (Full Information Likelihood) could mitigate the biases 
resulting from cases that are truly MCAR or MAR. No matter the true mechanism, this study is 
still a viable attempt at observing the effects it set out to test. Beyond being key to beginning a 
conversation about how mental health can impose on global processes like identity and perceived 
self-continuity, the present study’s results could still be valuable for replication attempts, 
especially for those who are interested in testing more highly powered and complex models (e.g., 
latent change score models; McArdle, 2009) that may necessitate parameter starting values.  
 Finally, it is possible that MNAR data could be forestalled in future studies if data were 
collected from a variety of sources rather than relying solely on self-report methods. This 
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possibility leads to the fourth limitation of the current work: Overreliance on self-report methods. 
Using only one method of data collection makes researchers susceptible to errors arising as a 
result of common method variance (Williams & Brown, 1994) and biases such as self-
enhancement (e.g.,Taylor, 1989). Although self-report methods are popular, convenient, and 
generally reliable methods of assessment (Vazire, 2006), informant-reports represent a 
reasonable alternative to data collection should researchers wish to prevent the possible 
introduction of bias (Olino & Klein, 2015). Given the nature of this study, however, yet another 
alternative to self-report data collection would be if questionnaires or structured interviews were 
administered by trained clinical professionals. In practice, the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck 
et al., 1996) is among the most commonly used tools to quantitatively assess depressive 
symptoms; however, several other interviewer-administered tools are available to assess 
depression (e.g., Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview; Sheehan et al., 1998; Structured 
Clinical Interview for the DSM-5; First, Williams, Karg, & Spitzer, 2015). As conceptualized by 
Burrow and his colleagues (2017), derailment has some clinical implications and it is therefore 
possible that assessments of derailment could be transformed into formats that are better suited 
for use in practice. If this is the case, more avenues would be made available for researchers to 
continue to test and assess the depression-derailment dynamic using methods other than self-
report. 
Future Directions 
 Including the need for replication of the present study, several routes for future research 
are inspired by the findings at hand. First, identifying possible moderators could represent many 
next steps. For example, in the present study, derailment’s trajectory was shown to be best 
captured by a knot function whereby derailment was relatively high at the beginning of the 
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academic year, but then stabilized at a lower level as the year continued. What is yet to be 
discovered is if this knot trajectory is common across students from other universities, consistent 
across years of college, and if this knot trajectory is observed in non-student populations. That is, 
whether this knot exists across all emerging adults equally is a testable question for future 
research. Maybe it is the case that the college environment inherently contains stabilizing 
properties best-equipped to temper those highest on derailment. Testing the knot trajectory 
across a variety of contexts will be able to clue theorists into the generalizability of these 
findings, and if there are periods of the life span where we tend to observe more volatility in 
derailment than others. If, for example, a knot only tends to be apparent in student populations, 
future work testing interventions targeting derailment might find that they are best suited for 
those embarking on new chapters of their lives. 
Taken together, the findings invite questions regarding the nuances of derailment and its 
outcomes. Given the unexpected negative prospective relation between derailment and 
depression found in the present study, future investigation is needed to understand why these 
results deviate from previous findings that mark derailment as a signal of dysfunction. Clear 
from the results presented here is that derailment may not ubiquitously predict negative 
outcomes. Perhaps derailment can have two sides based on valence – could there be both “good” 
and “bad” types of derailment? People who feel as though they have changed for the better tend 
to have lower net well-being than those who report relative self-stability (e.g., Keyes, 2000), 
though that is not to say that those who do, in fact, feel like they are changing for the better are 
on a path toward debilitation. It is reasonable then to question if a “good” type of derailment 
could be beneficial or motivating – rather than distressing – to individuals. If derailment does 
possess salutary effects, some may investigate if inducing derailment is advisable and under what 
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conditions this effect persists. For example, the sample at hand is exclusively college students. 
As such, is it a good thing to sense derailment in college versus other contexts? Also, are there 
times during college (e.g., freshman year versus other years) in which it is better to sense 
derailment than others, and are there ways we can call upon college counselors to help 
individuals in a developmentally-sensitive way? Moreover, derailment’s ambiguity in terms of 
outcome inspires questions about the role of temporal precedence. If derailment does not always 
lead to negative outcomes, then perhaps it is the case at derailment that results from first 
experiencing depression is the type of derailment that can make one feel more ensnared and 
predict subsequent depression. That is, maybe it is only a feedback loop that begins with 
depression that can actually position one on a downward spiral. Indeed, depression tends to be 
more unequivocal in terms of the outcomes it precipitates. Future research on this front is 
necessary to determine if there are latent classes of individuals who follow certain trajectories of 
depression and derailment over longer periods of time, and if these trajectories can predict 
certain outcomes. All in all, research investigating such nuances of derailment might help to 
explain the discrepant results that are now present in the derailment-depression literature. 
In yet another test of moderation, perhaps the depression-derailment feedback loop 
changes as a function of one’s engagement with a lost possible self. If continuing to stay engaged 
with a lost possible self tends to be related to negative outcomes (King & Raspin, 2004; King & 
Smith, 2004; Wrosch et al., 2005) whereas disengagement from unattainable goals tends to be 
better for well-being (Klinger, 1975, 1977; Wrosch et al., 2005), maybe derailment only leads to 
depression in cases where there remains high salience or engagement with a lost possible self. As 
alluded to above, it may be easier to disengage from lost possible selves when there are many 
other possible selves to follow, like in the case of a young person beginning their journey 
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through college. Indeed, this is leveraged by statistics suggesting that nearly 75% of individuals 
will change their major at least once during their undergraduate career (Gordon, 1995) and over 
one-third of students enter college with an “undecided” major (Malgwi, Howe, & Bumaby, 
2011).  
Along a similar line of questioning, maybe the relation between derailment and 
depression is mediated by a process like rumination (the proclivity to perseverate in negative 
thought; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination has been nominated as a causal influence on the 
development of depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), and maybe individuals who go 
on to develop depression as a result of feeling as though they are derailed are actually doing so 
due to increased ruminative activity on the lost course. Rumination could also act as a moderator 
in that, for those low on rumination, the relation between derailment and subsequent depression 
is negative whereas for those who engage in high rumination, the relation between derailment 
and later depression is positive. If future research comes to favor the positive relation between 
derailment and successive depressive symptoms, on one hand, future researchers could dive into 
the psychometric properties of derailment versus scales of depression and rumination to 
investigate if these are distinguishable constructs. On the other hand, future researchers could 
launch qualitative or mixed-methods studies to investigate if individuals experiencing depression 
appear to be engaging in ruminative thought that has a derailment-like flair. 
 Ruminative tendencies, however, are not unique to depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, 
& Lyubomirsky, 2008). Similarly, research questions focused on if and what role derailment 
plays in other clinical disorders is a promising route for researchers interested in the present 
work. The question to be answered here would be whether derailment can be conceptualized as a 
transdiagnostic process. Considering that self and identity figure prominently in other clinical 
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issues such as self-injury (Adam, Rodham, & Gavin, 2005; Breen, Lewis, & Sutherland, 2013), 
eating disorders (Corning & Heibel, 2016; Stanghellini, Castellini, Brogna, Faravelli, & Ricca, 
2012; Verschueren et al., 2017), alcohol use (Chambers, Canvin, Baldwin, & Sinclair, 2017; 
Lindgren, Ramirez, Olin, & Neighbors, 2016; Montes, Dearing, Claus, & Witkiewitz, 2017), 
schizophrenia (Aakre, Klingaman, & Docherty, 2015; Boulanger, Dethier, Gendre, & Blairy, 
2013), and bipolar disorder (Inder, Crowe, Moor, Luty, Carter, & Joyce, 2008), pursuits similar 
to the current study could be taken up to investigate if derailment shares a similar – or even more 
robust – association with these other disorders. If this is the case, perhaps greater attention will 
be given to identity, self-continuity, and other developmental processes in the context of the 
etiology, taxonomy, and treatment of mental disorders (Kaufman, Montgomery, & Crowell, 
2014). 
Conclusion 
 Depression is one of the most well-known, discussed, and prevalent mental health issues 
of the modern age (Hogg, 2011; Kessler et al., 2005; Rasmussen & Ewoldsen, 2013). 
Furthermore, emerging adulthood – and the college experience in particular – not only allows 
one to deeply consider self-related negotiations (Arnett, 2000, 2004), but also presents a pivotal 
life transition that leaves individuals vulnerable to the development of problematic thoughts and 
behaviors (e.g., Alfeld-Liro & Sigelman, 1998; Compas, Wagner, Slavin, & Vannatta, 1986; 
Dyson & Renk, 2006). Thus, understanding what may maintain and/or be spurred by depression 
is a preeminent task. The present study tested a novel claim about the relation between mental 
health and identity processes by attempting to establish a dynamic association between 
depressive symptoms and derailment. Although the present study did not conceptually support 
the earlier findings of Burrow and his colleagues (2017), a positive prospective relation was 
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found in the opposite direction of the effect whereby depression positively predicted derailment 
at subsequent waves. These findings suggest that depression might have some influence on the 
extent to which individuals sense stability when evaluating their life course. The present study 
opened several exciting doors for future research to investigate how and why derailment might 
share a nuanced association with depression and other mental health disorders. Further, this 
study builds upon burgeoning work suggesting that mental health can and does affect how we 
perceive ourselves (e.g., Cast & Welch, 2015; Cruwys & Gunaseelan, 2016; McGrath & Repetti, 
2002). As literature continues to grow in this regard, it is hoped that the present study can 
contribute to a future of research where the theory and treatment of depression may be guided 
toward a more inclusive perspective, one that extends further than acute symptomatology. With a 
more holistic approach to depression’s formulation and effects, as well as a sense for when in the 
lifespan one’s identity and self-stability are most sensitive to mental health concerns, it is hoped 
that a more contextualized view of the human experience can begin to take shape.  
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DS - INSTRUCTIONS 
Please take some time to read each statement carefully and decide the extent to which you agree with each 
statement on the scale provided. For each set of questions, use the scale that precedes the set. 
 
A B C D E 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Slightly Disagree Neutral Slightly Agree Strongly Agree 
 
1. I am surprised at who I have become. 
2. Sometimes I notice how different I am now from who I used to be. 
3. I did not anticipate becoming the person that I currently am. 
4. I feel like I have always been the same person that I am today. 
5. I feel like I've become a different type of person over time. 
6. How I saw myself in the past is different from how I see myself now. 
7. I see myself now as the person I always thought I'd be. 
8. My life has been heading in the same direction for a long time. 
9. My motivations in life have been the same over time. 
10. I do not feel very connected to who I was in the past. 
 
BDI - INSTRUCTIONS 
Please read each group of statements carefully and then pick out the one statement in each group that 
best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, including today. If several 
statements in the group seem to apply equally well, circle the statement which appears the furthest down 
on the list for that group. 
11. Sadness 
A. I do not feel sad. 
B. I feel sad much of the time. 
C. I am sad all of the time. 
D. I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
12. Pessimism 
A. I am not discouraged about my future. 
B. I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
C. I do not expect things to work out for me. 
D. I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
13. Past Failure 
A. I do not feel like a failure. 
B. I have failed more than I should have. 
C. As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
D. I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
14. Loss of Pleasure 
A. I get as much pleasure as I ever did from things I enjoy. 
B. I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to. 
C. I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
D. I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
15. Guilty Feelings 
A. I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
B. I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
C. I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
D. I feel guilty all of the time. 
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16. Punishment Feelings 
A. I don’t feel I am being punished. 
B. I feel I may be punished. 
C. I expect to be punished. 
D. I feel I am being punished. 
17. Self-dislike 
A. I feel the same about myself as ever. 
B. I have lost confidence in myself. 
C. I am disappointed in myself. 
D. I dislike myself. 
18. Self-Criticalness 
A. I don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
B. I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
C. I criticize myself for all my faults. 
D. I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
19. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
A. I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
B. I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
C. I would like to kill myself. 
D. I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
20. Crying 
A. I don’t cry any more than I used to. 
B. I cry more than I used to. 
C. I cry over every little thing. 
D. I feel like crying, but I can’t. 
21. Agitation 
A. I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
B. I feel more restless or wound up than usual. 
C. I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still. 
D. I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something. 
22. Loss of Interest 
A. I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
B. I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
C. I have lost most of my interest in other people or things. 
D. It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
23. Worthlessness 
A. I do not feel I am worthless. 
B. I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to. 
C. I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
D. I feel utterly worthless. 
24. Indecisiveness 
A. I make decisions about as well as ever. 
B. I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
C. I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
D. I have trouble making any decisions. 
25. Loss of Energy 
A. I have as much energy as ever. 
B. I have less energy than I used to have. 
C. I don’t have enough energy to do very much. 
D. I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 
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26. Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
A. I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
B. I sleep somewhat more OR less than usual. 
C. I sleep a lot more OR less than usual. 
D. I either sleep most of the day OR wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep. 
27. Irritability 
A. I am no more irritable than usual. 
B. I am more irritable than usual. 
C. I am much more irritable than usual. 
D. I am irritable all the time. 
28. Changes in Appetite 
A. I have not experienced any change in my appetite. 
B. My appetite is somewhat less OR greater than usual. 
C. My appetite is much less OR greater than usual. 
D. I either have no appetite at all OR I crave food all the time. 
29. Concentration Difficulty 
A. I can concentrate as well as ever. 
B. I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
C. It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
D. I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
30. Tiredness or Fatigue 
A. I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
B. I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
C. I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
D. I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
31. Loss of Interest in Sex 
A. I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
B. I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
C. I am much less interested in sex now. 
D. I have lost interest in sex completely. 
 
R - INSTRUCTIONS 
People think and do many different things when they feel depressed. Please read each of the items below 
and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost always think or do each one when 
you feel down, sad, or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should 
do. For each set of questions, use the scale that precedes the set. 
 
A B C D 
Almost Never Sometimes Often Almost Always 
 
32. Think about how alone you feel 
33. Think “I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of this” 
34. Think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness 
35. Think about how hard it is to concentrate 
36. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” 
37. Think about how passive and unmotivated you feel 
38. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are depressed 
39. Think about how you don't seem to feel anything anymore 
40. Think "Why can't I get going?" 
41. Think "Why do I always react this way?" 
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A B C D 
Almost Never Sometimes Often Almost Always 
 
42. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way 
43. Write down what you are thinking about and analyze it 
44. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better 
45. Think "I won't be able to concentrate if I keep feeling this way." 
46. Think "Why do I have problems other people don't have?" 
47. Think "Why can't I handle things better?" 
48. Think about how sad you feel 
49. Think about all your shortcomings, failings, faults, mistakes 
50. Think about how you don't feel up to doing anything 
51. Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are depressed 
52. Go someplace alone to think about your feelings 
53. Think about how angry you are with yourself 
 
DIDS - INSTRUCTIONS 
Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the 
provided scale. For each set of questions, use the scale that precedes the set. 
 
A B C D E 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
 
54. I have decided on the direction I am going to follow in my life. 
55. I have plans for what I am going to do in the future. 
56. I know which direction I am going to follow in my life. 
57. I have an image about what I am going to do in the future. 
58. I have made a choice on what I am going to do with my life. 
59. I think actively about different directions I might take in the future. 
60. I think about different things I might do in the future. 
61. I am considering a number of different lifestyles that might suit me. 
62. I think about different goals that I might pursue. 
63. I am thinking about different lifestyles that might be good for me. 
 
 
LET - INSTRUCTIONS 
Please take some time to read each statement carefully and decide the extent to which you agree with each 
statement on the scale provided. For each set of questions, use the scale that precedes the set. 
 
A B C D E 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Slightly Disagree Neutral Slightly Agree Strongly Agree 
 
64. There is not enough purpose in my life. 
65. To me, the things I do are all worthwhile. 
66. Most of what I do seems trivial and unimportant to me. 
67. I value my activities a lot. 
68. I don’t care very much about the things I do. 
69. I have lots of reasons for living. 
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P - INSTRUCTIONS 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal characteristics and traits. Read each item 
and decide to what extent you agree or disagree. For each set of questions, use the scale that precedes the 
set. 
 
A B C D E AB AC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
70. When I am working on something, I cannot relax until it is perfect. 
71. One of my goals is to be perfect in everything I do. 
72. I never aim for perfection on my work. 
73. I seldom feel the need to be perfect. 
74. I strive to be as perfect as I can be. 
75. It is very important that I am perfect in everything I attempt. 
76. I strive to be the best at everything I do. 
77. I demand nothing less than perfection of myself. 
78. It makes me uneasy to see an error in my work. 
79. I am perfectionistic in setting my goals. 
80. I must work to my full potential at all times. 
81. I do not have to be the best at whatever I'm doing. 
82. I do not have very high goals for myself. 
83. Please select "Agree" (not "Strongly Agree" or "Somewhat Agree") to this statement and continue 
with the survey as usual. 
84. I set very high standards for myself. 
85. I must always be successful at school or work. 
 
 
CFI - INSTRUCTIONS 
Please use the scale below to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. For each set of questions, use the scale that precedes the set. 
 
A B C D E AB AC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
86. I am good at “sizing up” situations. 
87. I have a hard time making decisions when faced with difficult situations. 
88. I consider multiple options before making a decision. 
89. When I encounter difficult situations, I feel like I am losing control. 
90. I like to look at difficult situations from any different angles. 
91. I seek additional information not immediately available before attributing causes to behavior. 
92. When encountering difficult situations, I become so stressed that I cannot think of a way to 
resolve the situation. 
93. I try to think about things from another person's point of view. 
94. I find it troublesome that there are so many different ways to deal with difficult situations. 
95. I am good at putting myself in others' shoes. 
96. When I encounter difficult situations, I just don't know what to do. 
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A B C D E AB AC 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neutral Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
97. It is important to look at difficult situations from many angles. 
98. When in difficult situations, I consider multiple options before deciding how to behave. 
99. I often look at a situation from different viewpoints. 
100. I am capable of overcoming the difficulties in life that I face. 
101. I consider all the available facts and information when attributing causes to behavior. 
102. I feel I have no power to change things in difficult situations. 
103. When I encounter difficult situations, I stop and try to think of several ways to resolve it. 
104. I can think of more than one way to resolve a difficult situation I'm confronted with. 
105. I consider multiple options before responding to difficult situations. 
 
 
BAI - INSTRUCTIONS 
Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please carefully read each item in the list. Indicate how 
much you have been bothered by each symptom during the past week, including today. For each set of 
questions, use the scale that precedes the set. 
 
A B C D 
Not at All Mildly  
(Did not bother me much) 
Moderately  
(Very unpleasant, but I 
could stand it) 
Severely  
(I could barely stand it) 
 
106. Numbness or tingling 
107. Feeling Hot 
108. Wobbliness in Legs 
109. Unable to relax 
110. Fear of the worst happening 
111. Dizzy or lightheaded 
112. Heart pounding or racing 
113. Unsteady 
114. Terrified 
115. Nervous 
116. Feelings of Choking 
117. Hands trembling 
118. Shaky 
119. Fear of losing control 
120. Difficulty breathing 
121. Fear of dying 
122. Scared 
123. Indigestion or discomfort in abdomen 
124. Faint 
125. Face flushed 
126. Sweating (not due to heat) 
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DEMOGRAPHICS - INSTRUCTIONS 
Please select the most appropriate answer for you. 
 
 
Please enter your NetID (Prefix of your Cornell email address before the "@" sign): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. What is your biological sex? 
A. Male 
B. Female 
C. Intersex 
 
2. With which gender do you identify? 
A. Man 
B. Woman 
C. Other 
 
If you would like, please specify your gender identity below if you selected “Other” to the 
previous question: 
 
 
 
3. What is your current age (in years)?: 
 
4. What is your racial/ethnic background? Please circle all that apply. 
A. White/Caucasian, non-Hispanic 
B. Black/African-American, non-Hispanic 
C. Asian/Asian-American or Pacific Islander 
D. Hispanic or Latino/a 
E. Native American or Alaskan Native 
AB. Other 
 
5. Please select your parents’ highest level of education. 
Mother: 
A. Did not complete high school 
B. High school diploma or equivalent 
C. Some college, including vocational/technical school 
D. Bachelor’s degree 
E. Graduate or Professional school 
 
Father: 
a. Did not complete high school 
b. High school diploma or equivalent 
c. Some college, including vocational/technical school 
d. Bachelor’s degree 
e. Graduate or Professional school 
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6. Which college or school at Cornell are you currently enrolled in? 
A. College of Agriculture and Life Sciences (CALS) 
B. College of Architecture, Art, and Planning (AAP) 
C. College of Arts and Sciences (CAS) 
D. College of Engineering 
E. School of Hotel Administration (SHA) 
AB.   College of Human Ecology (CHE) 
AC.   School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) 
AD.   Cornell Law School (LAW) 
AE.   Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management (JOHNSON) 
ABA.  College of Veterinary Medicine 
 
7. What year in school are you? 
A. 1st Year/Freshman 
B. 2nd Year/Sophomore 
C. 3rd Year/Junior 
D. 4th Year/Senior 
AB. 5+ Year 
AC. Graduate Student 
 
8. Is this year the first time that you are leaving home to attend college/university? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
If you selected “No” to the previous question, please briefly explain your circumstances below: 
Example: “I am a returning Cornell Student.” 
 
 
 
 
 
9. As of today, are you registered/enrolled as a Cornell student? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
 
10. If applicable, in which Residence Hall do you live? 
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